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In Re Fisher, 15 Ill.2d 139, 153 = N.E.2d=20 832 (Ill. 09/18/1958)

[1]	SUPREME COURT OF = ILLINOIS.
[2]	No. 34518., Respondent = censured.
[3]	15 Ill.2d 139, 153 N.E.2d 832, 1958.IL.0000409=20 = <http://www.versuslaw.com>
[4]	OPINION FILED SEPTEMBER 18, 1958. =
[5]	IN RE THOMAS HART FISHER, ATTORNEY, = RESPONDENT.
[6]	DISCIPLINARY = PROCEEDING.
[7]	CHARLES LEVITON, of Chicago, amicus curiae. WILLIAM C. = WINES,=20 of Chicago, for respondent.
[8]	MR. JUSTICE HOUSE DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE = COURT:
[9]	Rehearing denied November 26, 1958.
[10]	This is a disciplinary proceeding against Thomas Hart Fisher, an = attorney, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 59. The Committee on = Inquiry=20 of the Chicago Bar Association filed a complaint charging him with = obtaining from his client written assignments of alimony, child = support=20 and suit fees containing powers of attorney, and filing subsequent = petitions for increases in alimony without disclosing the = existence of the=20 assignments. He is further charged with seeking to obtain alimony = and=20 child support payments for his own use, and obtaining such = payments in=20 August and October, 1945.
[11]	The complaint also charges that respondent repudiated an = agreement=20 made by him and his client before Judge Lewe, by filing petitions = for=20 increased payments and thereby breaching his professional duty of = good=20 faith and candid and honorable dealing toward the = courts.
[12]	He is accused of launching a campaign of litigation against his=20 client's husband for the purpose of enforcing his purported rights = under=20 these assignments by filing an action in the United States = District Court=20 reopening the husband's bankruptcy estate, and a fraud action in = the=20 circuit court of Lake County concerning title to real estate; and=20 allegedly representing a fraudulent administrator in the probate = court of=20 Cook County. It is alleged that each of the foregoing acts = violates=20 respondent's ethical and professional duty as a member of the bar = and=20 tends to defeat the administration of justice and bring the courts = and the=20 legal profession into disrepute.
[13]	Respondent filed an answer to the complaint, and hearings were=20 conducted before the Committee on Grievances of the Chicago Bar=20 Association sitting as commissioners of this court. The matter is = brought=20 here on the report of the committee, together with its findings of = fact=20 and recommendations. The committee recommended that respondent be=20 suspended from the practice of law for one year, but the=20 Board of Managers, as commissioners, altered the recommendation to = suspension for a period of five years.
[14]	Although complex and difficult to fit into chronological = sequence, the=20 facts are not in dispute. It is the interpretation to be given = such facts=20 that raises the issues.
[15]	Respondent was admitted to the practice of law in Illinois in = 1922.=20 For a period of about ten years he practiced as a partner in a = firm in=20 which his father and brother were members. Since that time he has=20 practiced individually and with associates, engaging in local, = interstate=20 and international practice. From January, 1938, until December, = 1946, he=20 represented Charlotte Case Joslyn in her separate maintenance and = divorce=20 actions against her husband, George R. Joslyn. It is stated that = this is=20 the only contested divorce action in which he has engaged. From = May, 1944,=20 to July, 1955, he represented the Order of Elks against the = bankruptcy=20 estate of George R. Joslyn before the United States District Court = for the=20 Northern District of Illinois. From September, 1939, to about May, = 1946,=20 he acted as attorney in a fraud action between Mr. and Mrs. Joslyn = concerning the title to their real estate. A review of all this = litigation=20 finds the respondent weaving and threading his way across the = pages of two=20 reported cases in the United States District Court, five appeals = to the=20 United States Court of Appeals, at least three appeals to the = Illinois=20 Appellate Court, and two appeals to this court, all of which would = furnish=20 a contemporary counterpart to Jarndyce v. Jarndyce. (Bleak House, = by=20 Charles Dickens.)
[16]	Mr. and Mrs. Joslyn were married in 1928 and of this marriage = four=20 children were born. Encountering marital difficulties, they = entered into a=20 separation agreement providing for the support of Mrs. Joslyn and = the four=20 children and making disposition of their home in Lake Bluff. In = September,=20 1938, respondent filed a separate maintenance action on behalf of = Mrs.=20 Joslyn in the superior court of Cook County. Apparently this suit = was=20 discontinued when he filed an action for divorce = for Mrs.=20 Joslyn in August of 1939. The complaint for divorce charged Mr. = Joslyn=20 with desertion. He answered and filed a counterclaim charging her = with=20 adultery. In September, 1939, the divorce court entered an order = pendente=20 lite requiring Mr. Joslyn to pay Mrs. Joslyn as temporary alimony = and=20 child support the sum of $750 per month until further order of the = court.=20 Trial of the divorce action was commenced before Judge John C. = Lewe on=20 June 14, 1940, and continued intermittently throughout the summer = of 1940.=20 On August 12, 1940, while the divorce action was pending, = respondent=20 obtained a written assignment from Mrs. Joslyn, providing, in=20 part:
[17]	"I, Charlotte C. Joslyn, * * * do hereby irrevocably constitute = and=20 appoint Thomas Hart Fisher, * * * my * * * attorney coupled with = an=20 interest * * * to demand, receive, sue for, and collect all claims = * * =20 due to me from George R. Joslyn on account of any alimony = payments, * =20 solicitor's fees and suit moneys pursuant to any order or orders=20 heretofore or hereafter entered * * including * * * all payments = for=20 $750 per month due me for the months of August, September, and = October,=20 1940; * * *.
[18]	"Upon the non-payment of any such debt, money or demand = whatsoever, I=20 do hereby authorize and direct my said attorney to begin, conduct = and=20 prosecute any action, * * * for recovering and compelling the = payment=20 thereof. * * *
[19]	"I do hereby assign * * * all right, title, claim or interest * = * * in=20 or to any moneys now due * * * me pursuant to any order for = alimony, suit=20 money and solicitors' fees pursuant to any order heretofore and = hereafter=20 entered in said proceeding * * *."
[20]	The foregoing assignment will be considered in connection with = later=20 assignments hereinafter referred to.
[21]	On September 30, 1940, after hearing evidence in the divorce = action,=20 Judge Lewe called Mr. and Mrs. Joslyn into chambers to discuss the = possibility of settlement. The litigants were in apparent = agreement that a=20 decree for divorce in favor of Mrs. Joslyn on the grounds of = desertion,=20 granting her $100 per month alimony and $400 per month for the support of the children and making provision for the=20 custody of the children, would be satisfactory, although = respondent=20 indicated that he did not consider his client = bound.
[22]	A decree for divorce was entered on October 1, 1940. It provided = $100=20 per month alimony for Mrs. Joslyn and $400 per month for child = support.=20 Thirty eight days later, on November 8, 1940, respondent filed a = petition=20 on behalf of Mrs. Joslyn to increase the alimony and child support = payments from the $500 per month provided in the decree to a sum = not less=20 than $1,500 per month. This petition asserted, among other things, = that=20 Mr. Joslyn was the beneficiary of two trust funds created by his = mother=20 and father which provided him with an income of $33,750 per year = and that=20 the allowance of $500 per month was inadequate in view of Mr. = Joslyn's=20 means and station in life. On November 26, 1940, the court denied = this=20 petition and no appeal was taken therefrom. However, on December = 28, 1940,=20 respondent initiated an appeal for Mrs. Joslyn from the alimony = and child=20 support provisions of the decree for divorce. The Appellate Court = decision=20 (Joslyn v. Joslyn, 315 Ill. App. 160,) affirming the trial court's = decree,=20 painstakingly recites the evidence in connection with the = agreement=20 between Mr. and Mrs. Joslyn in Judge Lewe's chambers, and = respondent's=20 subsequent statements to the court with regard to such agreement, = and=20 concludes that the parties had agreed on the amount of alimony and = child=20 support and that respondent, by his actions, statements and = conduct, had=20 acquiesced therein.
[23]	We believe it appropriate at this point to pass upon = respondent's=20 conduct, other than in connection with the first assignment, on = the day of=20 the divorce proceeding before Judge Lewe. He declined to settle = the issues=20 concerning his attorney fees and expenses on the basis that he did = not=20 want it said that he had settled his client's case in order to get attorney fees and that to provide for attorney=20 fees in the decree for divorce would invalidate the decree. He had = been=20 paid the sum of $1,000 and Mr. Joslyn was willing to pay him an = additional=20 $1,500 in full settlement of his attorney fees. He did not object = to this=20 offer nor otherwise indicate to the court that such amount was = inadequate=20 but agreed to a provision in the decree that, in determining what = fees=20 should be paid, the court should consider the matter as though the = issues=20 upon the counterclaim had been determined in favor of Mr. Joslyn. = The=20 record also shows that, whatever may have been his motive for so = doing,=20 the respondent did tell the court, when the litigants returned = from Judge=20 Lewe's chambers, that he could not agree that Mrs. Joslyn could = not claim=20 any more alimony at any time nor that she would be bound by the = amounts=20 set forth in the decree. He advised the court that the plaintiff = must be=20 left in the position in which she found herself after the court = entered=20 the decree, and that the provision for alimony was not done by = agreement=20 but would have to be done on the court's own = responsibility.
[24]	We do not find that respondent agreed to abide by the terms of = the=20 decree, consequently, neither the filing of an appeal nor the = petitions=20 for increases in alimony and attorneys fees constituted a = repudiation of=20 any agreement made before Judge Lewe. His statements left the door = open to=20 a later petition for an increase in support for Mrs. Joslyn and = for=20 attorney's fees and expenses. On the same day that respondent = filed the=20 first petition for increase in alimony and support in behalf of = Mrs.=20 Joslyn, he also filed a separate petition, consisting of 44 pages = and 561=20 items, claiming $19,770 attorney fees, $730.31 for cash = disbursements and=20 $3,690.85 for unpaid expenses. This petition was referred to the = master in=20 chancery but, for reasons appearing later, the master's report was = not=20 submitted to the trial court until April 22, 1947.=20
[25]	On April 8, 1941, while the appeal from the decree for divorce = was=20 pending, respondent obtained a second assignment from Mrs. Joslyn, = providing in part:
[26]	"I, Charlotte C. Joslyn, * * * assign * * * all right, title, = claim or=20 interest * * * to any moneys now due and payable * * * to me for = suit=20 moneys, solicitors' fees and alimony over the sum of $100 per = month=20 pursuant to any order heretofore or hereafter entered in * * * = [Joslyn v.=20 Joslyn,] provided, however, that the foregoing assignment shall = not be=20 deemed to require the undersigned or George R. Joslyn * * * to pay = to the=20 assignee hereunder any moneys payable to the undersigned for the = support =20 * of the four minor children * * *.
[27]	"And I, the undersigned, do hereby irrevocably constitute and = appoint=20 Thomas Hart Fisher my true and lawful attorney in fact for me and = in my=20 name to demand, receive, sue for, and collect all claims, debts, = moneys=20 and demands * * * due to me * * * in the foregoing assignment, * * = * the=20 power herein given my said attorney shall be deemed to be coupled = with the=20 interest herein given.
[28]	"Upon the non-payment of any such debt, money, or demand = whatsoever, I=20 do hereby authorize my said attorney to begin, conduct and = prosecute any=20 action * * * for recovering and compelling the payment thereof. = And I do=20 further authorize and direct my said attorney * * * to adjust, = arbitrate=20 and settle any such claim, debt, money or demand whatsoever and = any=20 action, suit or proceedings in respect thereto."
[29]	On April 8, 1941, he obtained a third assignment and power of = attorney=20 coupled with an interest from Mrs. Joslyn, similar in import to = the=20 assignment last above, assigning to respondent all her rights in = her home=20 in Lake Bluff, and all her rights, except that which pertained to = child=20 support, under the property settlement entered into between her = and Mr.=20 Joslyn. Contemporaneously with the two assignments dated April 8, = 1941,=20 she signed and delivered a letter addressed to respondent in which = she=20 commended him for his previous services, asserted her reliance on = his=20 talents, and recited that the two assignments dated April 8, 1941, = were to=20 be effective only if certain legal proceedings conducted pursuant = thereto=20 were successful and that said assignments were to be effective up = to such=20 time as respondent had been reimbursed for his = fees,=20 expenses and advances incurred in her affairs.
[30]	The appeal from the decree of divorce (Joslyn v. Joslyn, 315 = Ill. App.=20 160) was decided in June, 1942. On October 1, 1942, respondent = filed=20 another petition for Mrs. Joslyn setting forth, among other = things, that=20 since the entry of the decree for divorce, she had expended money = in=20 excess of child support, had incurred extra liabilities, and = because of=20 the rise in cost of living it was necessary to modify the decree = by=20 increasing her allowances. An order was entered December 16, 1942, = increasing her alimony and support payments to $1,000 per month = for a=20 three-year period but granting to Mr. Joslyn the election to = discontinue=20 the increased payments and revert to the $500 per month as = provided in the=20 original decree for divorce. This order further provided that Mrs. = Joslyn=20 was to set aside sufficient money to pay income taxes and to apply = all=20 money in excess of $500 to the liquidation of her = debts.
[31]	In January, 1944, respondent filed a third petition for increase = in=20 alimony and child support payments, similar to the other = petitions, but=20 reciting that Mr. Joslyn had paid Mrs. Joslyn the increased amount = of=20 $1,000 per month for only a period of five months and thereafter = had=20 reduced the payments to $500 per month. On March 16, 1944, the = trial court=20 entered an order again increasing the payments to $1,000 per month = but=20 provided that Mr. Joslyn was to apply the additional $500 per = month to pay=20 Mrs. Joslyn's creditors, and when such creditors had been paid Mr. = Joslyn=20 could reduce the payments $500 per month.
[32]	In February, 1946, respondent filed a fourth petition for Mrs. = Joslyn=20 to increase the support payments. This petition recited that = during the=20 period from February, 1938, to January, 1946, she had received an = average=20 of $8,487.25 per year but that this was insufficient to meet her = needs and=20 expenditures. It reasserted Mr. Joslyn's benefits under the trust = created=20 by his parents, that he was entitled to receive some=20 $40,000 per year income therefrom, averred that Mrs. Joslyn was = entitled=20 to an equitable lien upon the trust income and asked for an = increase in=20 support payments reasonably necessary to pay her support and = expenses. The=20 petition also prayed that the trustees of the trust and trust = depository=20 bank be made parties defendant and that Mrs. Joslyn be entitled to = an=20 equitable lien upon Mr. Joslyn's trust income. The disposition of = this=20 petition is not shown, probably for the reason that on December = 14, 1946,=20 Mrs. Joslyn dismissed respondent and hired other counsel to = represent her.=20 Her petition to change counsel recited that respondent could = continue to=20 act for her in her petititon for suit money. This the respondent = proceeded=20 to do.
[33]	On December 17, 1946, respondent filed an answer to Mrs. = Joslyn's=20 petition to substitute attorneys and a cross petition claiming his = fees=20 and expenses. For the first time, he disclosed the existence of = the=20 assignments and powers of attorney obtained from Mrs. Joslyn on = August 12,=20 1940, and April 8, 1941, when he attached copies to the cross = petition.=20 His statement for services, dated July 1, 1946, was for a total = sum of=20 $60,885, which included his original claim for fees filed on = November 8,=20 1940, but which had not been passed upon. The master, to whom the = petition=20 for fees was referred, denied his petition because "by his = actions, his=20 false statements, and his conduct, unbecoming a lawyer" he was = guilty of=20 unclean hands and not entitled to relief. The trial judge to whom = the=20 master's report was submitted found that the conduct of respondent = was=20 censurable but nevertheless entered an order allowing him the sum = of=20 $6,500, but deducted therefrom the sum of $2,000 and taxed one = half the=20 court costs against him. Respondent appealed from this order but = attacked=20 only the part of the order taxing costs. The Appellate Court, in a = decision concisely setting forth the facts, severely criticized = respondent=20 for flagrantly abusing court processes primarily for his own interests, denied him any fees, and taxed the costs again=20 him. Joslyn v. Joslyn, 337 Ill. App. 443.
[34]	Respondent is accused of launching a campaign of litigation = against=20 George R. Joslyn by reopening the Joslyn bankruptcy, by the = proceeding to=20 recover the Lake Bluff property for Mrs. Joslyn, and by = respondent's=20 representation of a false administrator of the Radzuk estate and = the=20 action by the administrator against the employees trust fund of = the Joslyn=20 Manufacturing and Supply Company. It is alleged that respondent = initiated=20 these proceedings for the purpose of forcing a settlement from Mr. = Joslyn=20 which would enable the respondent to enforce his purported rights = under=20 the aforementioned assignments. The specification concerning the=20 administration of the Radzuk estate and the action against the = trust fund=20 was dismissed for lack of proof. It is not clear from the report = or the=20 findings and recommendations what conclusions are drawn from the = facts=20 concerning respondent's connection with the Lake Bluff property=20 litigation. However, with reference to the bankruptcy litigation, = the=20 committee found that respondent's conduct was contrary to public = policy=20 which condemns barratry, maintenance and champerty; and that he = attempted=20 to use the bankruptcy proceeding as a means of making George R. = Joslyn pay=20 him fees which he had been unable to procure in the State=20 courts.
[35]	No useful purpose can be served by our attempt to recite the = facts in=20 connection with the primary bankruptcy matter or the many summary = and=20 plenary proceedings related thereto. We think that case has = received ample=20 attention in the Federal courts. (Young v. First National Bank, = (N.D. Ill.=20 1949) 85 F. Supp. 68; In re Joslyn, (N.D. Ill. 1951) 102 F. Supp. = 521; In=20 re Joslyn's Estate, Fisher v. Young, (7th Cir. 1948) 168 F.2d 803; = In re=20 Joslyn's Estate, (7th Cir. 1948) 171 F.2d 159; In re Fisher, (7th = Cir.=20 1950) 179 F.2d 361; In re Joslyn, (7th Cir. 1952), 198 F.2d 673; = In re Joslyn's Estate, Fisher v. Joslyn (7th Cir. 1955) = 223 F.2d 184.) Similarly, the Lake Bluff case has had its share of = attention in our State courts. (Joslyn v. Joslyn, 380 Ill. 181; = Joslyn v.=20 Joslyn, 318 Ill. App. 643; Joslyn v. Joslyn, 386 Ill. 387; Clarke = v.=20 Chicago Title and Trust Co. 393 Ill. 419.) The courts before whom = these=20 matters were presented did not treat them as barratrous or = champertous but=20 accorded to them due consideration. Both proceedings appear to = have=20 resulted in some measure of success for respondent's = client.
[36]	Furthermore, we have considered the disciplinary proceedings = brought=20 against the respondent in the United States District Court for the = Northern District of Illinois on charges similar to those here = presented.=20 Respondent's appeal from suspension for three years resulted in a = reversal=20 by the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. (In re Fisher, = 179 F.2d=20 361.) As we recently indicated (In re Teitelbaum, 13 Ill.2d 586),=20 disciplinary actions against attorneys practicing before the = Illinois=20 courts are our responsibility but the views of the Federal courts = are=20 entitled to great weight. This is especially true where the = charges arise=20 out of Federal litigation. This record does not contain the clear = and=20 satisfactory proof necessary to sustain the committee's conclusion = that=20 respondent's connection with these two cases proves him guilty of=20 barratry, maintenance and champerty.
[37]	We next consider the charge that the filing of petitions for = increase=20 in alimony and support for Mrs. Joslyn, while having in his = possession the=20 undisclosed assignments, shows that he sought to obtain for his = own use=20 the money decreed for alimony. The committee concludes he was = furtively=20 seeking to establish a basis for attacking the decree; that he had = a=20 deliberate plan to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of the = parties=20 to the case and that this is sufficient basis to suspend = respondent from=20 the practice of law for a period of five years.=20
[38]	We think the evidence is sufficient to show that his failure to = make=20 candid and forthright disclosure of the existence of the = assignments to=20 the court alone subjects him to criticism and censure, but not the = severe=20 penalty of suspension.
[39]	While the four petitions to increase alimony and child support = were=20 extremely vexatious to Mr. Joslyn, they were partially successful. = They=20 were executed by Mrs. Joslyn, were presented in her behalf, and = she=20 received some benefits thereby. It is true that the respondent had = the=20 assignments in his possession during the period of time the = petitions were=20 prepared and presented but there is no proof in this record that = the=20 petitions were filed to obtain the money for the respondent or = that he=20 ever actually obtained money directly therefrom. Respondent did = receive=20 $5,230 from Mrs. Joslyn from moneys later released for her benefit = by the=20 district court in the Joslyn bankruptcy. But since there is no = proof to=20 the contrary, we must accept the evidence as we find it in this = record to=20 the effect that he had advanced such sum to Mrs. Joslyn and was = lawfully=20 entitled to be repaid therefor. Except for the sum of $5,230 and = $1,000=20 paid to him by Mr. Joslyn during the pendency of the divorce = action, the=20 record does not show that he was paid any money for his legal = services.=20 Neither do we find any proof to substantiate the charge that in = August and=20 October, 1945, respondent obtained alimony and child support = payments for=20 his own use.
[40]	While it may have been, although we do not so decide by this = opinion,=20 that his claim for fees, advances and expenses was exorbitant = under the=20 circumstances, he had the undoubted right to properly present his = claim to=20 the court. This was done and the matter has been properly = adjudicated.=20 (Joslyn v. Joslyn, 337 Ill. App. 443.) Alimony and child support = are=20 continuing obligations subject to change as the conditions and=20 circumstances of the parties may warrant. Mrs. Joslyn had the = right to=20 petition for such increases just as Mr. Joslyn = had the=20 right to petition for a reduction thereof, where their changed = conditions=20 and circumstances might dictate such action. Having such rights, = it became=20 the duty of their respective attorneys to properly represent them = in such=20 matters.
[41]	One of the principal contentions of amicus curiae is that the=20 assignments dated August 12, 1940, and April 8, 1941, are = unprofessional,=20 show moral turpitude, are contrary to public policy, and are = contrary to=20 good conscience; that they tend to stir up litigation, discourage=20 reconciliation and purport to employ respondent in=20 perpetuity.
[42]	Alimony is that allowance which is made to a woman, in a decree = of=20 divorce, for her support out of the estate of a husband. It is the = equivalent of the obligation implied in every marriage contract = that the=20 husband shall furnish his wife a suitable support and maintenance. = (Adams=20 v. Storey, 135 Ill. 448.) It is not a means for penalizing the = husband but=20 is established according to the respective rights of the parties = litigant=20 pursuant to the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. = (Byerly v.=20 Byerly, 363 Ill. 517.) A decree of divorce not only concerns the = parties=20 litigant but affects the public morals and domestic relations of = the=20 people. The public has an interest therein, not only in = maintaining the=20 integrity and permanency of the marriage relation (Ollman v. = Ollman, 396=20 Ill. 176), but also in the maintenance of the social obligations = arising=20 therefrom. An award of alimony is a continuation of those = obligations in=20 which the public, through the services of its courts, not only = maintains=20 an interest but which it graces with its protection. Welty v. = Welty, 195=20 Ill. 335.
[43]	The instruments in question purport to assign to the respondent = all=20 alimony to which his client might be entitled, and irrevocably = authorize=20 him to act as her attorney to demand, receive, sue for and collect = all=20 such money then or thereafter due her for alimony. It would be = difficult=20 to devise a more conclusive or efficient means of frustrating the purpose of alimony or negate the labors of a court in=20 granting an award of alimony. While this precise question has not=20 heretofore been presented to us, we did, in the case of People ex = rel.=20 Healy v. Barrios, 237 Ill. 527, condemn an agreement between an = attorney=20 and his divorce client whereby he was to receive as payment for = his=20 attorney fees all moneys collected from her husband as alimony or=20 otherwise and disbarred the attorney for his subsequent misconduct = based=20 on such an agreement. However, in the Barrios case the attorney = was=20 condemned primarily for his misuse of moneys collected for his = client=20 rather than the taking of an agreement.
[44]	Courts of other jurisdictions have been practically unanimous in = condemning contingent fee contracts in divorce actions as contrary = to=20 public policy. (See Anno. 30 A.L.R. 188; 5 Am. Jur. p. 361.) As in = the=20 early leading case of Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N.W. = 826, most=20 courts have based their holdings upon the premise that assignments = of=20 alimony tend to deter or prevent reconciliation between husband = wife. (See=20 also In re Smith, (Wash. 1953) 254 P.2d 464; State v. Dunker, = (1955) 160=20 Neb. 779, 71 N.W.2d 502; Baskerville v. Baskerville, (1956) 246 = Minn. 496,=20 75 N.W.2d 762; Welles v. Brown, (1924) 226 Mich, 657, 198 N.W. = 180.) We=20 conclude that it is against sound public policy for attorneys to = take=20 assignments of alimony or enter into contingent fee contracts in = divorce=20 actions. To hold otherwise would tend to encourage divorce rather = than=20 reconciliation of estranged couples.
[45]	We are faced with the question of whether the foregoing rule = should be=20 applied to this case. Respondent contends, and we think = rightfully, that=20 our holding should not be applied retroactively. He cites the = cases of=20 Dietz v. Speybroeck, 225 Ill. App. 133, Rasmussen v. Rasmussen, = 334 Ill.=20 App. 308, and Dickerman v. Jones, 328 Ill. App. 131, each of which = dealt=20 with contingent contracts in divorce cases. Even though the policy = question was neither raised nor passed upon in = any of=20 those cases, respondent could have relied upon them. The foregoing = Appellate Court decisions shall not hereafter be regarded as = precedents on=20 this point, but the taking of the assignments in question will not = be used=20 as the basis for any disciplinary action in this case. Cf. In re = Luster,=20 12 Ill.2d 25.
[46]	Considerations which move and guide us in this type of case are = well=20 summarized in the case of In re Donaghy, 402 Ill. 120, at page=20 123:
[47]	"The legal calling is a time-honored profession and the courts = owe a=20 duty to protect the public from impositions and improper = practices. This=20 duty has repeatedly been declared by this court. (People ex rel. = Chicago=20 Bar Ass'n v. Lotterman, 353 Ill. 399; People ex rel Chicago Bar = Ass'n v.=20 Green, 353 Ill. 638; People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Hansen, = 316 Ill.=20 502.) Such duty, and the manner in which it is exercised, must not = be=20 despotic, but the charges must be sustained by clear and = convincing proof=20 and the misconduct must be shown to have been fraudulent and the = result of=20 improper motives, and the proof must show intent. (In re Smith, = 365 Ill.=20 11.) The courts must not exercise their supervisory control in an=20 arbitrary manner, but must show a legal discretion in the exercise = thereof. In re Lasecki, 358 Ill. 69.
[48]	"The disbarrment of an attorney is the destruction of his = professional=20 life, his character, and his livelihood. (People ex rel. Chicago = Bar Ass'n=20 v. Mall, 354 Ill. 323; In re Lasecki, 358 Ill. 69; In re Dunn, 370 = Ill.=20 413.) The court should, therefore, disbar in moderation. (People = ex rel.=20 Chicago Bar Ass'n v. A'Brunswick, 315 Ill. 442.) Likewise the same = considerations obtain in the application of a three-year = suspension rule.=20 A removal of an attorney from practice for a period of years = entails the=20 complete loss of a clientele with its consequent uphill road of = patient=20 waiting to again re-establish himself in the eyes of the public, = in the good graces of the courts and his fellow = lawyers.=20 In the meantime, his income and livelihood have ceased to exist. = The=20 courts, however, should not hesitate to inflict the penalty where = the=20 punishment is fully deserved."
[49]	Here we have a lawyer who took from his client instruments which = would, if improperly asserted, have been grossly unfair not only = to his=20 client but to the courts from whom his client sought relief. As an = officer=20 of the court he is required to shun even the appearance of a = fraudulent=20 design or purpose. (In re Alschuler, 388 Ill. 492.) By failing to = disclose=20 the existence of the assignments to the court while seeking = additional=20 support money in which he had an interest, he created the very = condition=20 he should have avoided. Moreover, the record is replete with = instances of=20 his vacillation and equivocation in situations demanding his = utmost candor=20 and loyalty to the courts before whom he practiced. His redemption = in this=20 regard is that the record shows that he was zealously, perhaps = over=20 zealously, presenting matters ostensibly in behalf of his client, = some of=20 which ultimately resulted in her benefit.
[50]	While we feel the commissioners' recommendation of suspension = from the=20 practice of law for five years may be too harsh, it should, by no = means,=20 be inferred that we approve of respondent's acts and conduct as a = lawyer.=20 His failure to apprise the court of the assignments until he was = forced to=20 do so in answering his client's petition for a substitution of = attorneys=20 warrants our censure, with the admonition that we not be called = upon to=20 judge his professional conduct in the future.
[51]	Respondent censured.

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