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In Re Marriage of Blaisdell, 492 = N.E.2d=20 622, 142 Ill. App.3d 1034 (Ill.App. Dist.1 04/29/1986)

[1]	ILLINOIS APPELLATE COURT FIRST DISTRICT (2ND DIVISION) JUDGMENT=20 AFFIRMED.
[2]	No. 84-3088
[3]	492 N.E.2d 622, 142 Ill. App.3d 1034, 1986.IL.0000539=20 = <http://www.versuslaw.com>
[4]	OPINION FILED APRIL 29, 1986.
[5]	IN RE MARRIAGE OF ELIZABETH A. BLAISDELL, K/N/A ELIZABETH A. = BORIS,=20 PETITIONER-APPELLEE, v. WILLIAM S. BLAISDELL,=20 RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
[6]	Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the Hon. Barbara = J.=20 Disko, Judge, presiding.
[7]	Richard Gigante, P.C., of Chicago (Paul R. Jenen, of counsel), = for=20 appellant. Aviva Futorian, of Illinois Task Force on Child = Support,=20 and Robert P. Burns, of Northwestern Law School, both of Chicago, = for=20 appellee. Lewis A. Hoffman, of Dunedin, Florida, for amicus = curiae=20 Men International, Inc. Marygold Shire Melli, of University = of=20 Wisconsin Law School, of Madison, Wisconsin (Nancy Polikoff, of = counsel),=20 for amicus curiae Women's Legal Defense = Fund.
[8]	PRESIDING JUSTICE BILANDIC DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE=20 COURT:
[9]	This is an action commenced in June 1984, by petitioner, = Elizabeth=20 Boris, a divorced, custodial parent, to obtain a modification of a = child-support order that had been originally awarded in 1979 = pursuant to a=20 dissolution of marriage. Following hearings in October and = November 1984,=20 the trial court found that petitioner had shown a substantial = change in=20 circumstances. The trial court found further that an increase in = the=20 support order was justified in an amount authorized by section = 505(a) of=20 the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which had become effective on September 12, 1984 (Ill. Rev.=20 Stat. 1985, ch. 40, par. 505(a)). The court ordered an increase in = monthly=20 child-support payments.
[10]	Respondent, William Blaisdell, appeals the trial court's award. = The=20 issues presented for review are:
[11]	(1) whether section 505(a) violates any of the following = provisions of=20 the Federal or Illinois constitutions:
[12]	(a) 1970 Illinois Constitution, article II, section 1, and = article IV,=20 section 1, concerning the separation of powers and the vesting of = the=20 judicial power in the State courts,
[13]	(b) 1970 Illinois Constitution, article IV, section 13, = prohibiting=20 special legislation,
[14]	(c) 1970 Illinois Constitution, article I, sections 2 and 18, = and=20 United States Constitution, amendment XIV, clause 1, prohibiting=20 deprivation of property without due process of law and prohibiting = denial=20 of equal protection of the laws, and
[15]	(d) 1970 Illinois Constitution, article I, section 12, providing = a=20 right to a remedy for injuries;
[16]	(2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding = that an=20 increase in child support was warranted; and
[17]	(3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying = the=20 statutory guidelines of section 505(a) and in finding no = justification for=20 deviating from the guidelines.
[18]	The judgment of dissolution of marriage was entered in 1979. = Under the=20 terms of the judgment, which incorporated the parties' agreement,=20 petitioner was awarded custody of the couple's two-year-old son, = Bart.=20 Respondent was to pay $275 a month in child support, and both = parties=20 waived maintenance.
[19]	On June 8, 1984, when Bart was seven years old, petitioner filed = a=20 motion for an increase in respondent's child-support payments, = alleging=20 both that the child had increased needs and that respondent had = increased=20 income. The trial court held hearings on the motion on October 17 = and=20 November 9, 1984. The evidence revealed that petitioner had a net = monthly=20 income of $2,046 and that respondent's current net monthly income = was=20 $1,986. The income for each party had increased since the entry of = the=20 judgment of dissolution.
[20]	Petitioner also introduced evidence showing that the needs of = their=20 son had increased. This was attributable to higher expenses for = school=20 tuition, camp, child care and counseling.
[21]	The trial court found that petitioner sustained her burden of = showing=20 the increased needs of Bart and the increase in respondent's = ability to=20 pay child support. The court also found that it "must follow the = guidelines established by the new law passed by the=20 legislature." Finding that respondent's net monthly income was=20 approximately $2,000, the court ordered child support increased = from $275=20 per month to $400 per month.
[22]	Respondent's motion for reconsideration was denied. This appeal=20 followed.
[23]	I
[24]	THE CHALLENGED STATUTE
[25]	Section 505 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage = Act=20 provides in part as follows:
[26]	"Sec. 505. Child Support; Contempt; Penalties. (a) In a = proceeding for=20 dissolution of marriage, legal separation, declaration of = invalidity of=20 marriage, a proceeding for child support following dissolution of = the=20 marriage by a court which lacked personal jurisdiction over the = absent=20 spouse or any proceeding authorized under Section 601 of this Act, = the=20 court may order either or both parents owing a duty of support to = a child=20 of the marriage to pay an amount reasonable and necessary for his = support,=20 without regard to marital misconduct, after considering all = relevant=20 factors, including:
[27]	(1) the financial resources of the child;
[28]	(2) the financial resources and needs of the custodial=20 parent;
[29]	(3) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the=20 marriage not been dissolved;
[30]	(4) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his=20 education needs; and
[31]	(5) the financial resources and needs of the non-custodial = parent or=20 parents
[32]	In cases involving child support alone, the court shall = determine the=20 minimum amount of support by using the following = guidelines:
[33]	Number of Children Percent of Income (Net) 1 20% 2 25% 3 32% 4 = 40% 5=20 45% 6 or more 50%
[34]	In cases wherein health/hospitalization insurance coverage is = not=20 being furnished to dependents to be covered by the support order, = the=20 court shall order such coverage and shall reduce net income by the = reasonable cost thereof in determining the minimum amount of = support to be=20 ordered.
[35]	The above guidelines, including dependent health/hospitalization = insurance coverage are binding in each case unless the court makes = express=20 findings of fact as to the reason for departure below the = guidelines. The=20 guidelines may be exceeded by the court without express findings = or by=20 agreement of the parties. If the total gross income cannot be = determined=20 because of default or any other reason, the court shall order = maintenance=20 or support or both in an amount considered reasonable in the = particular=20 case.
[36]	Debts owed to private creditors are not to be considered in=20 establishing a support obligation. Previous support orders and = maintenance=20 orders may be considered if the obligor is paying them." (Ill. = Rev. Stat.=20 1985, ch. 40, par. 505.)
[37]	Statutes will be construed to avoid an unconstitutional result. = (Lopez=20 v. Fitzgerald (1979), 76 Ill.2d 107, 131-32, 390 N.E.2d 835.) = There is a=20 presumption that the legislative enactments are constitutional, = with the=20 burden of clearly establishing the contrary on the party that = asserts=20 unconstitutionality. Sayles v. Thompson (1983), 99 Ill.2d 122, = 124-25, 457=20 N.E.2d 440.
[38]	LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
[39]	Respondent's constitutional challenge is based on the assumption = that=20 under section 505(a) courts are mandated to follow literally the = schedule=20 for child support. If this reading is correct, the function of the = court=20 is reduced to that of a computer or robot. In this case, the sole = function=20 of the court would be to determine the net income of the = non-custodial=20 parent, determine the number of children, and calculate the amount = of=20 child support by applying the percentage of net income stated in = the=20 schedule. However, respondent has failed to show that the statute = can or=20 should be read to effectively prohibit judicial = discretion.
[40]	This fundamental failure to interpret correctly section 505(a), = as=20 amended by Public Act 83-1404, is clearly evident from the = legislative=20 history of Public Act 83-1404. Prior to the enactment of this = legislation,=20 the judges of the domestic relations division of the circuit court = of Cook=20 County adopted "Guidelines for Support and Maintenance=20 Orders," which stated:
[41]	"After numerous meetings the sitting Judges of the Domestic = Relations=20 Division have concluded it is desirable that all support orders be = as=20 uniform as possible where the facts are substantially the same. = The judges=20 have considered and reviewed guidelines established in the other = 49=20 states, other Illinois Judicial circuits and the American Bar=20 Association's studies and recommendations on the subject. In order = to=20 accomplish this end the judges of the division have decided to = adopt=20 GUIDELINES in setting support orders. The word `Guidelines' cannot = be=20 emphasized enough since no judge intends to surrender his = discretion in=20 setting awards or waiving relevant factors which the court must = consider=20 under Chapter 40, Sec. 504 and 505 of the Illinois Revised = Statutes. In=20 addition, the court will continue to consider the tax consequences = of such=20 orders and any effect they would have upon = `Guidelines.'
[42]	The following guidelines are to be considered in establishing = support=20 order for `typical' medium-income situations. Upward or downward=20 adjustments may be made by the court, depending on the needs of = the=20 children, the debts assumed by the non-custodial parent and other=20 extenuating circumstances and relevant factors. The income of the=20 non-custodial parent is not the only and sole controlling=20 factor.
[43]	The term `net income' means gross income less mandatory = deductions=20 such as federal and state withholding taxes, FICA, medical = insurance,=20 mandatory pension contributions, etc. Payment on a debt to the = company=20 credit union is not a `mandatory deduction.'
[44]	Thus, in an attempt to gain uniformity in support orders and = promote=20 amicable settlements the following per cent guidelines of the `net = income'=20 of the supporting party will be considered as a `starting point' = by the=20 sitting judges of the Domestic Relations = Division.
[45]	I
[46]	CHILD SUPPORT ALONE
[47]	Percent of Husband's Number of Children Income (Net) 1 20% 2 27% = 3 35%=20 4 42% 5 50% 6 55% 7 or more 55%
[48]	As indicated previously, the support allowance determined under = the=20 basic formula should be adjusted upward or downward to reflect = other=20 relevant circumstances. * * *"
[49]	(See Levin, The Use (and Abuse) of Child Support Schedules in=20 Illinois, 71 Ill. B.J. 314, 330 (1983).) These guidelines provided = the=20 basis for Public Act 83-1404, which enacted slightly lower = percentages.=20 During the debates on the date of passage in the House of = Representatives,=20 the sponsor, Representative Vinson, said: "The Bill enacts a set = of=20 standards * * . Those standards are in essence the standards that = Judge=20 Fleck utilized * * in Cook County." House Debates, H.B. 3068, = 83d Ill.=20 Gen. Assem., May 17, 1984, at 193.
[50]	The following colloquy occurred during the = debate:
[51]	"[REP. GREIMAN]: * * * Representative Vinson, does this remove = the=20 discretion from the court in setting up the = percentages?
[52]	[REP. VINSON]: No, Sir. What it does is it sets out a set of = statutory=20 percentages. The Judge may always enter an order in excess of the=20 statutory percentages and he can, in fact, enter an order below = the=20 statutory percentages, * * * he must enter a written statement of = findings=20 as to why he did that. What they really are are guidelines that = can be=20 changed up or down, but at least it's a set of statutory = guidelines, and=20 you have to have a reason for coming in below those=20 guidelines.
[53]	[REP. BRUMMER]: Representative Vinson, with regard to these=20 guidelines, how were they arrived at? Where did they come=20 from?
[54]	[REP. VINSON]: They're basically the Fleck guidelines that are=20 informally utilized in the Cook County Circuit Court currently." = House=20 Debates, H.B. 3068, 83d Ill. Gen. Assem., May 17, 1984, at 194,=20 199.
[55]	It is obvious that the legislature did not usurp any judicial=20 function. On the contrary, it codified the procedure that was = functioning=20 successfully in the circuit court of Cook County. The guidelines = merely=20 provide a place to begin an analysis. No judge should, or properly = could,=20 surrender the responsibilities of considering all relevant factors = dictated by Illinois law in reaching an appropriate result. = Matthews v.=20 Matthews (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 1049, 1053, 356 = N.E.2d=20 1083.
[56]	Section 505(a) was amended again in 1985 by Public Act 84-888 = and=20 Public Act 84-979, which retained the same child support = guidelines but=20 emphasized the discretion vested in the courts. Subsections (a)(2) = provided in part:
[57]	"(2) The above guidelines shall be applied in each case unless = the=20 court, after considering evidence presented on all relevant = factors, finds=20 a reason for deviating from the guidelines. Relevant factors may = include=20 but are not limited to:
[58]	(a) the financial resources of the child;
[59]	(b) the financial resources and needs of the custodial=20 parent;
[60]	(c) the standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the=20 marriage not been dissolved;
[61]	(d) the physical and emotional condition of the child, and his=20 education needs; and
[62]	(e) the financial resources and needs of the non-custodial = parent."=20 Pub. Act 84-888, sec. 2, eff. Sept. 23, 1985; Pub. Act 84-979, = sec. 2,=20 eff. Sept. 25, 1985.
[63]	=E2=80=A2 1 The statute with which we are dealing in this case, = section 505(a)=20 as amended by Public Act 83-1404, is not ambiguous. The fact that = the=20 legislature did not delete the original five factors listed for=20 determining child support awards means that the guidelines are not = to be=20 rigidly applied. The legislative history emphasizes judicial = discretion.=20 In spite of this abundance of clarity, if there were an ambiguity = in=20 Public Act 83-1404, it was cured with the subsequent enactment of = Public=20 Act 84-979. While this recent amendment was enacted too late to be = in=20 effect here, a subsequent amendment may be interpreted to indicate = a=20 legislative intent to clarify the law, rather than change it. In = re=20 Marriage of Davies (1982), 105 Ill. App.3d 661, 668, 434 N.E.2d = 357, rev'd=20 on other grounds (1983), 95 Ill.2d 474, 448 N.E.2d 882; see also, = In re=20 Application of Rosewell (1983), 97 Ill.2d 434, 454 N.E.2d 997 = (finding=20 that the legislature acted in subsequent legislation to correct=20 deficiencies that might otherwise suggest a lack of discretion in = the=20 court).
[64]	The guidelines legislation has, in reality, shifted the burden = of=20 presenting evidence in a child-support hearing to the parent who = wishes to=20 shift the non-custodial parent's contribution below or above the = specified=20 percentages. And the legislation has established standards for the = court=20 to follow in deviating from those percentages.
[65]	This flexibility in the law saves it against any of respondent's = allegations of unconstitutionality. When considered in the light = of this legislative history, the answers to the = constitutional=20 arguments become apparent.
[66]	SEPARATION OF POWERS
[67]	Respondent contends that section 505(a) violates the=20 separation-of-powers requirement of article II, section 1, or = article IV,=20 section 1 of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. This argument is = based on the=20 erroneous assumption that the trial court has no discretion to = also=20 consider the five relevant factors in the statute in determining = the level=20 of child support payments.
[68]	=E2=80=A2 2 In general, courts have struck down legislation as = violative of=20 separation of powers requirements where the legislation involved = rules=20 governing practice, pleading, procedure, appeals, or = administrative=20 matters that conflicted with judicially established rules. Courts = have=20 struck down legislation authorizing attorneys to conduct voir dire = examinations of prospective jurors, where pre-existing court rules = gave=20 the trial courts exclusive authority to conduct voir dire = examinations.=20 (People v. Jackson (1977), 69 Ill.2d 252, 260, 371 N.E.2d 602.) = The=20 supreme court invalidated legislation requiring the court to = notify all=20 attorneys of record before permitting the ex parte dismissal of a = case.=20 (Agran v. Checker Taxi Co. (1952), 412 Ill. 145, 105 N.E.2d 713.)=20 Legislation that prohibited continuance of bail and stay of = sentence after=20 a forcible felony was held invalid where such legislation = conflicted with=20 court rules permitting those practices. (People ex rel. Stamos v. = Jones=20 (1968), 40 Ill.2d 62, 237 N.E.2d 495.) And legislatively ordered=20 application of new legislation to cases decided before the = effective date=20 of the new legislation has been held to violate the separation of = powers=20 provisions of the Illinois Constitution. In re Marriage of Davies = (1982),=20 105 Ill. App.3d 661, 434 N.E.2d 357, rev'd on other grounds = (1983), 95=20 Ill.2d 474, 448 N.E.2d 882.
[69]	The legislation declared unconstitutional in the above examples = is=20 quite different from the legislation at issue in this case. The = former=20 involved procedural and administrative matters, traditionally the = province=20 of the courts. The child support guidelines involve application of = substantive law and are no more an incursion into the power of the = judiciary than was the prior provision for establishing child = support=20 awards under section 505.
[70]	Legislation similar to the law at issue here has been upheld = against=20 challenges of incursion into the powers of the judiciary. Thus,=20 legislation establishing mandatory sentencing guidelines has been = upheld.=20 (People v. Mathey (1983), 99 Ill.2d 292, 458 N.E.2d 499; People ex = rel.=20 Carey v. Chrastka (1980), 83 Ill.2d 67, 413 N.E.2d 1269; People = v. Bitner (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 1106, 412 N.E.2d 721, = appeal denied (1981), 82 Ill.2d 585.) Mandatory bifurcation of = contested=20 divorce trials with a 48-hour minimum wait has been upheld = (Strukoff v.=20 Strukoff (1979), 76 Ill.2d 53, 60, 389 N.E.2d 1170 (jurisdiction = of courts=20 to determine divorce matters is conferred by statute)), as has = mandatory=20 retirement ages for judges (Cusack v. Howlett (1969), 44 Ill.2d = 233, 254=20 N.E.2d 506).
[71]	Determination of child support involves no inherent judicial = powers.=20 It is a power conferred on the courts by the legislature, like = divorce. A=20 legislative amendment that circumscribes judicial discretion in = this area=20 is no more an incursion into judicial authority than is the = establishment=20 of mandatory sentencing guidelines.
[72]	SPECIAL LEGISLATION
[73]	Article IV, section 13, of the 1970 Illinois Constitution = prohibits=20 the enactment of special legislation in the following = terms:
[74]	"The General Assembly shall pass no special or local law when a=20 general law is or can be made applicable. Whether a general law is = or can=20 be made applicable shall be a matter for judicial=20 determination."
[75]	Respondent argues that the statute constitutes special = legislation in=20 violation of this constitutional provision. The very essence of = special=20 legislation is that "[i]t arbitrarily, and without a sound, = reasonable=20 basis discriminates in favor of a select group." (Emphasis in = original.)=20 Illinois Polygraph Society v. Pellicano (1980), 83 Ill.2d 130, = 137-38, 414=20 N.E.2d 458.
[76]	=E2=80=A2 3 Special legislation is that which "confers a special = benefit or=20 exclusive privilege on a person or group of persons to the = exclusion of=20 others similarly situated" (Illinois Polygraph Society v. = Pellicano=20 (1980), 83 Ill.2d 130, 137, 414 N.E.2d 458). The prerequisite to = special=20 legislation is the existence of a group on whom a special benefit = has been=20 conferred. However, respondent has failed to identify a particular = group=20 upon whom the statute bestows a benefit to the exclusion of = another group=20 similarly situated. Section 505(a) is a general law that operates = equally=20 among all divorced parents. A general law is one that operates = uniformly=20 throughout the State in all localities on all persons in like=20 circumstances and conditions. (People ex rel. City of Canton v. = Crouch=20 (1980), 79 Ill.2d 356, 374, 403 N.E.2d 242.) In ordering child = support,=20 the court is required to consider all relevant factors in making = its=20 determination.
[77]	Public Act 83-1404 represents not merely a rational but in fact = a very=20 reasonable effort on the part of the Illinois legislature to = allocate some of the costs of child care between the = parents when=20 they divorce. Nothing is arbitrary in an act that prescribed = certain=20 minimum standards for the non-custodial parent but permits = departure from=20 those standards if necessary. Accordingly, section 505(a) is = consistent=20 with constitutional standards in article IV, section 13, of the = 1970=20 Illinois Constitution.
[78]	PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
[79]	=E2=80=A2 4 Respondent next argues that the statute deprives him = of procedural=20 due process under both the Federal and State Constitutions. There = is, of=20 course, no doubt about the trial court's constitutional and = statutory=20 authority to enter a child-support order against a non-custodial = parent.=20 (See Zalduendo v. Zalduendo (1977), 45 Ill. App.3d 849, 360 N.E.2d = 386,=20 appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill.2d 628; Ill. Ann. Stat., ch. 40, par. = 505(a)=20 (Smith-Hurd 1985 Supp.).) Such an order must not violate the due = process=20 clause because it involves a deprivation of property. (Sniadach v. = Family=20 Finance Corp. (1969), 395 U.S. 337, 23 L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. = 1820.)=20 Because factual issues must be resolved, there is a right to a = hearing or=20 other procedure. Dixon v. Love (1977), 432 U.S. 105, 52 L.Ed.2d = 172, 97=20 S.Ct. 1723; Codd v. Velger (1977), 429 U.S. 624, 51 L.Ed.2d 92, 97 = S.Ct.=20 882.
[80]	Procedural due process requires that a party be afforded notice = and an=20 opportunity to be heard and to conduct a defense. (Nye v. Parkway = Bank=20 & Trust Co. (1983), 114 Ill. App.3d 272, 276, 448 N.E.2d 918.) = The=20 procedural protections afforded to respondent in the trial court = far=20 exceeded any which are constitutionally required. He had the = benefit of a=20 full, public evidentiary hearing, under the Code of Civil = Procedure, prior=20 to the "deprivation" about which he complains. He received = adequate notice=20 of the subject of the hearing, which was conducted before a = neutral=20 decision-maker, to whom he was entitled to present evidence and = witnesses,=20 subject to compulsory process, and to make legal argument himself = or=20 through an attorney. He was entitled to and did confront and = cross-examine=20 the only adverse witness, using documents obtained in regular = civil=20 discovery procedures, in an on-the-record hearing of which a = transcript=20 was prepared. The trial judge's decision was in writing, made = findings of=20 fact and drew conclusions of law. The decision resulted from an=20 application of applicable law solely to the facts of record. = Respondent's=20 procedural due process rights were lavishly protected. See = Goldberg v.=20 Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 25 L.Ed.2d 287, 90 S.Ct. = 1011.
[81]	Respondent cites Stanley v. Illinois (1972), 405 U.S. 645, 31 = L.Ed.2d=20 551, 92 S.Ct. 1208, in support of his attack on the statute. But the Illinois statute in Stanley had two defects not=20 present here. First, the statute created an irrebuttable = presumption that=20 unwed fathers of illegitimate children were unfit to raise those = children=20 and thus provided no hearing on the issue of their fitness and no=20 opportunity to rebut the presumption. Second, the statute in = Stanley was=20 sex-specific, operating only against unmarried fathers. Neither = mothers,=20 wed or unwed, nor married fathers were subject to such a=20 presumption.
[82]	In the instant case, no irrebuttable presumption operates. The=20 statutory guidelines create a fully rebuttable presumption that a=20 specified percentage of a non-custodial parent's income = constitutes an=20 appropriate child-support award. Section 505(a) operates in the = same way=20 regardless of the gender or marital status of the non-custodial=20 parent.
[83]	Respondent also claims a violation of procedural due process = from=20 application of section 505(a)'s percentage guidelines to a child = support=20 modification without first finding a substantial change in = circumstances.=20 but that is not what happened here. The trial judge recognized the = need to=20 find a substantial change in circumstances as a precondition to=20 determining the amount of any modified support order and found = that=20 petitioner had shown such a change.
[84]	Respondent also cites In re Marriage of Rundle (1982), 107 Ill. = App.3d=20 880, 883-84, 438 N.E.2d 229, and In re Marriage of Brophy (1981), = 96 Ill.=20 App.3d 1108, 1115, 421 N.E.2d 1308, appeal denied (1981), 85 = Ill.2d 563,=20 for the proposition that a trial court's use of schedules alone=20 constitutes an abuse of discretion. That too has no relevance to = this=20 case. The "schedules" involved in those cases were not the ones = contained=20 in section 505(a) and were not, in fact, established by the = legislature.=20 More important, the trial courts in those cases relied exclusively = on the=20 guidelines in setting support levels. By contrast, section 505(a) = utilizes=20 guidelines as a starting point in the support award determination, = and,=20 consistent with section 505(a), the trial court also looked to = other=20 factors in determining whether to apply the = guidelines.
[85]	In enacting section 505(a), the legislature had made a = determination,=20 subject to considerable flexibility in individual cases, as to the = proper=20 disposition of child support cases. This involves no procedural=20 defects.
[86]	SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
[87]	Domestic relations is "an area that has long been regarded as a=20 virtually exclusive province of the States." (Sosna v. Iowa = (1975), 419=20 U.S. 393, 404, 42 L.Ed.2d 532, 543, 95 S.Ct. = 553,=20 559-60.) As early as Pennoyer v. Neff (1877), 95 U.S. 714, 734-35, = 24=20 L.Ed. 565, 573, the Supreme Court noted that a State "has absolute = right=20 to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation = between its=20 own citizens shall be created, and the causes for which it may be=20 dissolved."
[88]	=E2=80=A2 5 Respondent contends that a non-custodial parent has = a fundamental=20 right not to support one's children, beyond the provision of basic = necessities, regardless of the parent's financial ability. Such a = right=20 would destroy the historic standards by which Illinois courts have = determined the appropriate amount of child support by taking into = account=20 the incomes of the parents. Respondent cites no authority to = support his=20 argument and we are not aware of any.
[89]	Respondent also contends that to the extent that non-custodial = parents=20 are required to pay more than the minimum cost of raising a child, = House=20 Bill 3068 infringes on the parent's right to remarry and have = additional=20 children, thereby violating substantive due process protected by = the=20 Federal Constitution. This argument, if accepted, would impede the = traditional authority of both the State legislature and State = courts to=20 regulate the determination and enforcement of child support orders = beyond=20 basic necessities. His argument is supported neither by logic nor = by=20 authority. The extent to which section 505(a) regulates the = marriage=20 relationship is well within the legislature's traditional power = and=20 responsibility in this area.
[90]	EQUAL PROTECTION
[91]	Respondent contends that the statute violates the equal = protection=20 clause of the Federal and State constitutions. The basis of his = argument=20 is that although the statute is neutral on its face, it unfairly=20 discriminates against men in favor of women in its application = because=20 statistics indicate that in 88% of divorces, men are the = non-custodial=20 parents.
[92]	=E2=80=A2 6 Respondent again relies on the assumption that the = statutory=20 guidelines are mandatory. Although the statute obviously = distinguishes=20 between custodial and non-custodial parents, the statute treats = all=20 divorced parents alike, and thus does not deny non-custodial = parents equal=20 protection. See, e.g., Sanders v. City of Springfield (1985), 130 = Ill.=20 App.3d 490, 497, 474 N.E.2d 438.
[93]	Even if the statute can be construed to treat non-custodial = parents=20 differently, such classification is proper. The equal protection = clause=20 does not deny a State the power to differentiate between persons = similarly=20 situated if there is a rational basis for doing so. (Jenkins v. Wu = (1984), 102 Ill.2d 468, 477, 468 N.E.2d 1162.) As = noted=20 above, the statute includes a percentage of non-custodial parents' = income=20 in order to standardize and increase child support in light of=20 comprehensive studies showing inadequate awards. See, e.g., = Williams,=20 Child Support and the Cost of Raising Children: Using Formulas to = Get=20 Adequate Awards, Institute for Court Management of the National = Center for=20 State Courts (May 3, 1985).
[94]	Sufficient differences exist between custodial and non-custodial = parents to warrant the conclusion that they comprise different = classes.=20 The major distinction here is that a custodial parent has the = primary and=20 general responsibility to care for the child.
[95]	Non-custodial parents are assessed a specific amount for child = support=20 payments, while custodial parents are not so assessed. But = custodial and=20 non-custodial parents are not "similarly situated" since, after = divorce,=20 the custodial parent's responsibility for the child's support as = well as=20 care is general and plenary, while the non-custodial parent's=20 responsibility is usually limited to the requirements of the = support=20 order. While both parents are responsible for the child's support, = it is=20 not the child support schedules themselves but the very fact that = the=20 non-custodial parent must discharge his or her responsibility by = making=20 cash payments to the custodial parent which initially = distinguishes them.=20 The schedules themselves do not create a legislative = "classification";=20 they merely structure, subject to court adjustment, the = non-custodial=20 parent's contribution in an effort to shift some of the burden of = care and=20 support from the custodial parent. The legislature could = rationally have=20 concluded that the percentages of the non-custodial parent's net = income=20 included in the guidelines constituted a fair point of departure = and fully=20 rebuttable presumption in attempting to equalize, or at least make = more=20 equitable, the share of the non-custodial parent's contribution. = Illinois=20 constitutional law requires no more.
[96]	That custodial parents are differently situated than = non-custodial=20 parents appears from the one case which the respondent cites = presumably in=20 support of his Illinois equal protection claim. In Hursh v. Hursh = (1975),=20 26 Ill. App.3d 947, 326 N.E.2d 95, the appellate court reversed an = order=20 which completely denied the custodial parent (the father) any = child=20 support payments from the non-custodial parent (the mother), even = though=20 the income of the non-custodial parent was higher than that of the = custodial parent. The trial court had apparently relied on the = fact that=20 the custodial parent made an adequate income. (26 Ill. App.3d 947, = 949,=20 326 N.E.2d 95.) Of course, in Hursh, the custodial parent had not = been=20 "assessed" any child support "obligation" = either, but=20 the court recognized the obvious fact that he was significantly=20 contributing to the needs of the child, while the non-custodial = parent was=20 contributing nothing, despite a significant income. Under those=20 circumstances, the court found a violation of the custodial = parent's right=20 to equal protection of the laws. (26 Ill. App.3d 947, 951, 326 = N.E.2d 95.)=20 In this case, on the other hand, the court, after considering the=20 contributions by both parents and their relative abilities to = contribute=20 to the child's support, has ordered the non-custodial parent to = increase=20 the amount he is paying for support of the child. This is, of = course,=20 consistent with section 505(a) which has required and continues to = require=20 both parents to contribute to the child's = support.
[97]	In amending section 505(a), the legislature could rationally = have=20 "assumed" that the custodial parent is already contributing to the = support=20 of the child in an amount equivalent to the percentage schedules, = and=20 constructed the schedules, subject to modification in any = individual case,=20 on that assumption. See Kujawinski v. Kujawinski (1978), 71 Ill.2d = 563,=20 376 N.E.2d 1382.) The statute does not deprive the respondent of = equal=20 protection of law under the Federal and Illinois=20 constitutions.
[98]	REMEDIES
[99]	Respondent's final constitutional claim consists of a bare = allegation=20 that section 505(a) violates the constitutional provision = mandating a=20 remedy for every injury. He cites no cases to support his=20 contention.
[100]	Most claims brought under article II, section 19, of the 1970 = Illinois=20 Constitution and its predecessor provisions have complained of a = lack of=20 access to the courts. These claims have been unsuccessful, the = courts'=20 holding that this constitutional provision is more an "expression = of=20 philosophy" than a constitutional mandate. See Sullivan v. = Midlothian Park=20 District (1972), 51 Ill.2d 274, 281 N.E.2d 659 (upholding = governmental=20 tort immunity law).
[101]	What respondent appears to be claiming is that the guidelines = deprive=20 him of due process of law. We have already disposed of that=20 issue.
[102]	II
[103]	=E2=80=A2 7 Respondent next contends that the trial court abused = its=20 discretion in increasing child support from $275 per month to $400 = per=20 month because petitioner failed to introduce any evidence of the = increased=20 needs for the minor child. We disagree.
[104]	The modification of child support lies within the sound = discretion of=20 the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an = abuse of=20 discretion. In re Marriage of Bussey (1985), 108 Ill.2d 286, 296, = 483=20 N.E.2d 1229.
[105]	The evidence revealed that the current child support = expenditures=20 increased by $330 per month since the entry of the 1979 support = order.=20 Tuition, unreimbursed medical costs, and camp fees accounted for = the=20 increase.
[106]	In 1979, respondent paid $275 per month for child support. If = one-half=20 of the $330 in increased expenses was charged to the respondent, = he would=20 pay $440 per month. He has no reasonable basis to complain about = the $400=20 per month order because the custodial parent will also contribute = toward=20 the increased child expenses. This computation does not take into = account=20 evidence presented regarding petitioner's increased household = expenses=20 since 1979 and does not charge any portion to the child. The order = of the=20 trial court does not constitute an abuse of = discretion.
[107]	The record also reveals that in 1979, the respondent's net = income was=20 approximately $1,250 per month. In 1984, it increased to = approximately=20 $2,000 per month. This increase in income lends further support to = the=20 reasonableness of the support order and the respondent's ability = to=20 comply.
[108]	III
[109]	Respondent contends that the court misconstrued the statute and=20 mechanically applied the guidelines. This erroneous argument has = been=20 considered and disposed of in dealing with some of his = constitutional=20 allegations.
[110]	The trial court conducted a full hearing concerning the income,=20 assets, expenditures, and needs of the parties and the child. = Respondent=20 was not denied the opportunity to present any evidence that would = justify=20 a lower child-support award. The court expressly found that the = child had=20 increased needs and that the respondent's income increased = sufficiently to=20 share in those additional expenses. The trial court's application = of the=20 statute was correct.
[111]	For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of = Cook=20 County is affirmed.
[112]	Affirmed.
[113]	STAMOS and HARTMAN, JJ., concur.=20

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