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Troxel v. Granville, No. 99-138 = (U.S.=20 06/05/2000)

[1]	SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED = STATES
[2]	No. 99-138
[3]	2000.SCT.0042117 = <http://www.versuslaw.com>
[5]	JENIFER TROXEL, ET VIR, PETITIONERS v. TOMMIE=20 GRANVILLE
[6]	SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
[7]	OCTOBER TERM, 1999
[8]	TROXEL v. GRANVILLE
[9]	NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be = released, as=20 is being done in connection with this case, at the time the = opinion is=20 issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the = Court but=20 has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience = of the=20 reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 = U. S.=20 321, 337.
[10]	SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
[11]	TROXEL et vir. v. GRANVILLE
[12]	Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of Washington
[13]	No. 99-138.
[14]	Argued January 12, 2000
[15]	Decided June 5, 2000
[16]	Washington Rev. Code =C2=A726.10.160(3) permits "[a]ny person" = to petition=20 for visitation rights "at any time" and authorizes state superior = courts=20 to grant such rights whenever visitation may serve a child's best=20 interest. Petitioners Troxel petitioned for the right to visit = their=20 deceased son's daughters. Respondent Granville, the girls' mother, = did not=20 oppose all visitation, but objected to the amount sought by the = Troxels.=20 The Superior Court ordered more visitation than Granville desired, = and she=20 appealed. The State Court of Appeals reversed and dismissed the = Troxels'=20 petition. In affirming, the State Supreme Court held, inter alia, = that=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3) unconstitutionally infringes on parents' = fundamental right=20 to rear their children. Reasoning that the Federal Constitution = permits a=20 State to interfere with this right only to prevent harm or = potential harm=20 to the child, it found that =C2=A726.10.160(3) does not require a = threshold=20 showing of harm and sweeps too broadly by permitting any person to = petition at any time with the only requirement being that the = visitation=20 serve the best interest of the child.
[17]	Held: The judgment is affirmed.
[18]	137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P. 2d 21, affirmed.
[19]	Justice O'Connor, joined by The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, = and=20 Justice Breyer, concluded that =C2=A726.10.160(3), as applied to = Granville and=20 her family, violates her due process right to make decisions = concerning=20 the care, custody, and control of her daughters. Pp. = 5-17.
[20]	(a) The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has a = substantive=20 component that "provides heightened protection against government=20 interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty = interests,"=20 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720, including parents'=20 fundamental right to make decisions concerning the care, custody, = and=20 control of their children, see, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. = S. 645,=20 651. Pp. 5-8.
[21]	(b) Washington's breathtakingly broad statute effectively = permits a=20 court to disregard and overturn any decision by a fit custodial = parent=20 concerning visitation whenever a third party affected by the = decision=20 files a visitation petition, based solely on the judge's = determination of=20 the child's best interest. A parent's estimation of the child's = best=20 interest is accorded no deference. The State Supreme Court had the = opportunity, but declined, to give =C2=A726.10.160(3) a narrower = reading. A=20 combination of several factors compels the conclusion that = =C2=A726.10.160(3),=20 as applied here, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process Clause. = First, the=20 Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that Granville was = an=20 unfit parent. There is a presumption that fit parents act in their = children's best interests, Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602; = there is=20 normally no reason for the State to inject itself into the private = realm=20 of the family to further question fit parents' ability to make the = best=20 decisions regarding their children, see, e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 = U. S.=20 292, 304. The problem here is not that the Superior Court = intervened, but=20 that when it did so, it gave no special weight to Granville's=20 determination of her daughters' best interests. More importantly, = that=20 court appears to have applied the opposite presumption, favoring=20 grandparent visitation. In effect, it placed on Granville the = burden of=20 disproving that visitation would be in her daughters' best = interest and=20 thus failed to provide any protection for her fundamental right. = The court=20 also gave no weight to Granville's having assented to visitation = even=20 before the filing of the petition or subsequent court = intervention. These=20 factors, when considered with the Superior Court's slender = findings, show=20 that this case involves nothing more than a simple disagreement = between=20 the court and Granville concerning her children's best interests, = and that=20 the visitation order was an unconstitutional infringement on = Granville's=20 right to make decisions regarding the rearing of her children. Pp. = 8-14.
[22]	(c) Because the instant decision rests on =C2=A726.10.160(3)'s = sweeping=20 breadth and its application here, there is no need to consider the = question whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental=20 visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm = to the=20 child as a condition precedent to granting visitation or to decide = the=20 precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation = context.=20 There is also no reason to remand this case for further = proceedings. The=20 visitation order clearly violated the Constitution, and the = parties should=20 not be forced into additional litigation that would further burden = Granville's parental right. Pp. 14-17.
[23]	Justice Souter concluded that the Washington Supreme Court's = second=20 reason for invalidating its own state statute -- that it sweeps = too=20 broadly in authorizing any person at any time to request (and a = judge to=20 award) visitation rights, subject only to the State's particular=20 best-interests standard -- is consistent with this Court's prior = cases.=20 This ends the case, and there is no need to decide whether harm is = required or to consider the precise scope of a parent's right or = its=20 necessary protections. Pp. 1-5.
[24]	Justice Thomas agreed that this Court's recognition of a = fundamental=20 right of parents to direct their children's upbringing resolves = this case,=20 but concluded that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of = review=20 to apply to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State = lacks a=20 compelling interest in second-guessing a fit parent's decision = regarding=20 visitation with third parties. Pp. 1-2.
[25]	O'Connor, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered = an=20 opinion, in which Rehnquist, C. J., and Ginsburg and Breyer, JJ., = joined.=20 Souter, J., and Thomas, J., filed opinions concurring in the = judgment.=20 Stevens, J., Scalia, J., and Kennedy, J., filed dissenting=20 opinions.
[26]	Court Below: 137 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P. 2d = 21
[27]	Mark D. Olson argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the = briefs=20 was Eric Schnapper.
[28]	Catherine W. Smith argued the cause for respondent. With her on = the=20 brief was Howard M. Goodfriend.
[29]	Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State = of=20 Washington et al. by Christine O. Gregoire, Attorney General of=20 Washington, and Maureen A. Hart, Senior Assistant Attorney = General, and by=20 the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Mark = Pryor=20 of Arkansas, Bill Lockyer of California, Ken Salazar of Colorado, = Earl I.=20 Anzai of Hawaii, Carla J. Stovall of Kansas, Jeremiah W. (Jay) = Nixon of=20 Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek of Montana, John J. Farmer, Jr., of = New=20 Jersey, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Betty D. Montgomery of = Ohio, and=20 Paul G. Summers of Tennessee; for AARP et al. by Rochelle Bobroff, = Bruce=20 Vignery, and Michael Schuster; for Grandparents United for = Children's=20 Rights, Inc., by Judith Sperling Newton and Carol M. Gapen; for = the=20 National Conference of State Legislatures et al. by Richard Ruda = and James=20 I. Crowley; and for the Grandparent Caregiver Law Center of the = Brookdale=20 Center on Aging.
[30]	Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the = American=20 Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers by Barbara Ellen Handschu and = Sanford K.=20 Ain; for the American Center for Law and Justice by Jay Alan = Sekulow,=20 Colby May, Vincent McCarthy, and John P. Tuskey; for the American = Civil=20 Liberties Union et al. by Matthew A. Coles, Michael P. Adams, = Catherine=20 Weiss, and Steven R. Shapiro; for the Coalition for the = Restoration of=20 Parental Rights by Karen A. Wyle; for the Institute for Justice et = al. by=20 William H.
[31]	Mellor, Clint Bolick, and Scott G. Bullock; for the Center for = the=20 Original Intent of the Constitution by Michael P. Farris; for the=20 Christian Legal Society et al. by Kimberlee Wood Colby, Gregory S. = Baylor,=20 and Carl H. Esbeck; for the Lambda Legal Defense and Education = Fund et al.=20 by Patricia M. Logue, Ruth E. Harlow, and Beatrice Dohrn; for the = Society=20 of Catholic Social Scientists by Stephen M. Krason and Richard W. = Garnett;=20 and for Debra Hein by Stuart M. Wilder.
[32]	Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Center for Children's = Policy=20 Practice & Research at the University of Pennsylvania by = Barbara=20 Bennett Woodhouse; for the Domestic Violence Project, Inc./Safe = House=20 (Michigan) et al. by Anne L. Argiroff and Ann L. Routt; for the = National=20 Association of Counsel for Children by Robert C. Fellmeth and Joan = Hollinger; and for the Northwest Women's Law Center et al. by = Cathy J.=20 Zavis.
[33]	On Writ Of Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of = Washington
[34]	Justice O'Connor announced the judgment of the Court and = delivered an=20 opinion, in which The Chief Justice, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice = Breyer=20 join.
[35]	Section 26.10.160(3) of the Revised Code of Washington permits = "[a]ny=20 person" to petition a superior court for visitation rights "at any = time,"=20 and authorizes that court to grant such visitation rights whenever = "visitation may serve the best interest of the child." Petitioners = Jenifer=20 and Gary Troxel petitioned a Washington Superior Court for the = right to=20 visit their grandchildren, Isabelle and Natalie Troxel. Respondent = Tommie=20 Granville, the mother of Isabelle and Natalie, opposed the = petition. The=20 case ultimately reached the Washington Supreme Court, which held = that=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3) unconstitutionally interferes with the = fundamental right of=20 parents to rear their children.
[36]	I.
[37]	Tommie Granville and Brad Troxel shared a relationship that = ended in=20 June 1991. The two never married, but they had two daughters, = Isabelle and=20 Natalie. Jenifer and Gary Troxel are Brad's parents, and thus the = paternal=20 grandparents of Isabelle and Natalie. After Tommie and Brad = separated in=20 1991, Brad lived with his parents and regularly brought his = daughters to=20 his parents' home for weekend visitation. Brad committed suicide = in May=20 1993. Although the Troxels at first continued to see Isabelle and = Natalie=20 on a regular basis after their son's death, Tommie Granville = informed the=20 Troxels in October 1993 that she wished to limit their visitation = with her=20 daughters to one short visit per month. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d = 1, 6,=20 969 P. 2d 21, 23-24 (1998); In re Troxel, 87 Wash. App. 131, 133, = 940 P.=20 2d 698, 698-699 (1997).
[38]	In December 1993, the Troxels commenced the present action by = filing,=20 in the Washington Superior Court for Skagit County, a petition to = obtain=20 visitation rights with Isabelle and Natalie. The Troxels filed = their=20 petition under two Washington statutes, Wash. Rev. Code = =C2=A7=C2=A726.09.240 and=20 26.10.160(3) (1994). Only the latter statute is at issue in this = case.=20 Section 26.10.160(3) provides: "Any person may petition the court = for=20 visitation rights at any time including, but not limited to, = custody=20 proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person = when=20 visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not = there=20 has been any change of circumstances." At trial, the Troxels = requested two=20 weekends of overnight visitation per month and two weeks of = visitation=20 each summer. Granville did not oppose visitation altogether, but = instead=20 asked the court to order one day of visitation per month with no = overnight=20 stay. 87 Wash. App., at 133-134, 940 P. 2d, at 699. In 1995, the = Superior=20 Court issued an oral ruling and entered a visitation decree = ordering=20 visitation one weekend per month, one week during the summer, and = four=20 hours on both of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays. 137 = Wash. 2d, at=20 6, 969 P. 2d, at 23; App. to Pet. for Cert. = 76a-78a.
[39]	Granville appealed, during which time she married Kelly Wynn. = Before=20 addressing the merits of Granville's appeal, the Washington Court = of=20 Appeals remanded the case to the Superior Court for entry of = written=20 findings of fact and conclusions of law. 137 Wash.2d, at 6, 969 P. = 2d, at=20 23. On remand, the Superior Court found that visitation was in = Isabelle=20 and Natalie's best interests:
[40]	"The Petitioners [the Troxels] are part of a large, central, = loving=20 family, all located in this area, and the Petitioners can provide=20 opportunities for the children in the areas of cousins and=20 music.
[41]	" ... The court took into consideration all factors regarding = the best=20 interest of the children and considered all the testimony before = it. The=20 children would be benefitted from spending quality time with the=20 Petitioners, provided that that time is balanced with time with = the=20 childrens' [sic] nuclear family. The court finds that the = childrens' [sic]=20 best interests are served by spending time with their mother and=20 stepfather's other six children." App. 70a.
[42]	Approximately nine months after the Superior Court entered its = order=20 on remand, Granville's husband formally adopted Isabelle and = Natalie. Id.,=20 at 60a-67a.
[43]	The Washington Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's = visitation=20 order and dismissed the Troxels' petition for visitation, holding = that=20 nonparents lack standing to seek visitation under = =C2=A726.10.160(3) unless a=20 custody action is pending. In the Court of Appeals' view, that = limitation=20 on nonparental visitation actions was "consistent with the = constitutional=20 restrictions on state interference with parents' fundamental = liberty=20 interest in the care, custody, and management of their children." = 87 Wash.=20 App., at 135, 940 P. 2d, at 700 (internal quotation marks = omitted). Having=20 resolved the case on the statutory ground, however, the Court of = Appeals=20 did not expressly pass on Granville's constitutional challenge to = the=20 visitation statute. Id., at 138, 940 P. 2d, at = 701.
[44]	The Washington Supreme Court granted the Troxels' petition for = review=20 and, after consolidating their case with two other visitation = cases,=20 affirmed. The court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' decision = on the=20 statutory issue and found that the plain language of = =C2=A726.10.160(3) gave=20 the Troxels standing to seek visitation, irrespective of whether a = custody=20 action was pending. 137 Wash. 2d, at 12, 969 P. 2d, at 26-27. The=20 Washington Supreme Court nevertheless agreed with the Court of = Appeals'=20 ultimate conclusion that the Troxels could not obtain visitation = of=20 Isabelle and Natalie pursuant to =C2=A726.10.160(3). The court = rested its=20 decision on the Federal Constitution, holding that = =C2=A726.10.160(3)=20 unconstitutionally infringes on the fundamental right of parents = to rear=20 their children. In the court's view, there were at least two = problems with=20 the nonparental visitation statute. First, according to the = Washington=20 Supreme Court, the Constitution permits a State to interfere with = the=20 right of parents to rear their children only to prevent harm or = potential=20 harm to a child. Section 26.10.160(3) fails that standard because = it=20 requires no threshold showing of harm. Id., at 15-20, 969 P. 2d, = at 28-30.=20 Second, by allowing " `any person' to petition for forced = visitation of a=20 child at `any time' with the only requirement being that the = visitation=20 serve the best interest of the child," the Washington visitation = statute=20 sweeps too broadly. Id., at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30. "It is not = within the=20 province of the state to make significant decisions concerning the = custody=20 of children merely because it could make a `better' decision." = Ibid., 969=20 P. 2d, at 31. The Washington Supreme Court held that "[p]arents = have a=20 right to limit visitation of their children with third persons," = and that=20 between parents and judges, "the parents should be the ones to = choose=20 whether to expose their children to certain people or ideas." Id., = at 21,=20 969 P. 2d, at 31. Four justices dissented from the Washington = Supreme=20 Court's holding on the constitutionality of the statute. Id., at = 23-43,=20 969 P. 2d, at 32-42.
[45]	We granted certiorari, 527 U. S. 1069 (1999), and now affirm the = judgment.
[46]	II.
[47]	The demographic changes of the past century make it difficult to = speak=20 of an average American family. The composition of families varies = greatly=20 from household to household. While many children may have two = married=20 parents and grandparents who visit regularly, many other children = are=20 raised in single-parent households. In 1996, children living with = only one=20 parent accounted for 28 percent of all children under age 18 in = the United=20 States. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, Current = Population=20 Reports, 1997 Population Profile of the United States 27 (1998).=20 Understandably, in these single-parent households, persons outside = the=20 nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to assist = in the=20 everyday tasks of child rearing. In many cases, grandparents play = an=20 important role. For example, in 1998, approximately 4 million = children --=20 or 5.6 percent of all children under age 18 -- lived in the = household of=20 their grandparents. U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Census, = Current=20 Population Reports, Marital Status and Living Arrangements: March = 1998=20 (Update), p. i (1998).
[48]	The nationwide enactment of nonparental visitation statutes is=20 assuredly due, in some part, to the States' recognition of these = changing=20 realities of the American family. Because grandparents and other = relatives=20 undertake duties of a parental nature in many households, States = have=20 sought to ensure the welfare of the children therein by protecting = the=20 relationships those children form with such third parties. The = States'=20 nonparental visitation statutes are further supported by a = recognition,=20 which varies from State to State, that children should have the=20 opportunity to benefit from relationships with statutorily = specified=20 persons -- for example, their grandparents. The extension of = statutory=20 rights in this area to persons other than a child's parents, = however,=20 comes with an obvious cost. For example, the State's recognition = of an=20 independent third-party interest in a child can place a = substantial burden=20 on the traditional parent-child relationship. Contrary to Justice = Stevens'=20 accusation, our description of state nonparental visitation = statutes in=20 these terms, of course, is not meant to suggest that "children are = so much=20 chattel." Post, at 10 (dissenting opinion). Rather, our = terminology is=20 intended to highlight the fact that these statutes can present = questions=20 of constitutional import. In this case, we are presented with just = such a=20 question. Specifically, we are asked to decide whether = =C2=A726.10.160(3), as=20 applied to Tommie Granville and her family, violates the Federal=20 Constitution.
[49]	The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no State shall "deprive = any=20 person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." = We have=20 long recognized that the Amendment's Due Process Clause, like its = Fifth=20 Amendment counterpart, "guarantees more than fair process." = Washington v.=20 Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 719 (1997). The Clause also includes a=20 substantive component that "provides heightened protection against = government interference with certain fundamental rights and = liberty=20 interests." Id., at 720; see also Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, = 301-302=20 (1993).
[50]	The liberty interest at issue in this case -- the interest of = parents=20 in the care, custody, and control of their children -- is perhaps = the=20 oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this = Court. More=20 than 75 years ago, in Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 = (1923),=20 we held that the "liberty" protected by the Due Process Clause = includes=20 the right of parents to "establish a home and bring up children" = and "to=20 control the education of their own." Two years later, in Pierce v. = Society=20 of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 (1925), we again held that the = "liberty=20 of parents and guardians" includes the right "to direct the = upbringing and=20 education of children under their control." We explained in Pierce = that=20 "[t]he child is not the mere creature of the State; those who = nurture him=20 and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, = to=20 recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." Id., at = 535. We=20 returned to the subject in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158 = (1944),=20 and again confirmed that there is a constitutional dimension to = the right=20 of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. "It is = cardinal=20 with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside = first in=20 the parents, whose primary function and freedom include = preparation for=20 obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder." Id., at=20 166.
[51]	In subsequent cases also, we have recognized the fundamental = right of=20 parents to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and = control of=20 their children. See, e.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 645, 651 = (1972)=20 ("It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, = care,=20 custody, and management of his or her children `come[s] to this = Court with=20 a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties = which=20 derive merely from shifting economic arrangements' " (citation = omitted));=20 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972) ("The history and = culture of=20 Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental = concern for=20 the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of = the=20 parents in the upbringing of their children is now established = beyond=20 debate as an enduring American tradition"); Quilloin v. Walcott, = 434 U. S.=20 246, 255 (1978) ("We have recognized on numerous occasions that = the=20 relationship between parent and child is constitutionally = protected");=20 Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979) ("Our jurisprudence=20 historically has reflected Western civilization concepts of the = family as=20 a unit with broad parental authority over minor children. Our = cases have=20 consistently followed that course"); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. = 745,=20 753 (1982) (discussing "[t]he fundamental liberty interest of = natural=20 parents in the care, custody, and management of their child"); = Glucksberg,=20 supra, at 720 ("In a long line of cases, we have held that, in = addition to=20 the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the = `liberty'=20 specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the righ[t] = ... to=20 direct the education and upbringing of one's children" (citing = Meyer and=20 Pierce)). In light of this extensive precedent, it cannot now be = doubted=20 that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects = the=20 fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the = care,=20 custody, and control of their children.
[52]	Section 26.10.160(3), as applied to Granville and her family in = this=20 case, unconstitutionally infringes on that fundamental parental = right. The=20 Washington nonparental visitation statute is breathtakingly broad. = According to the statute's text, "[a]ny person may petition the = court for=20 visitation rights at any time," and the court may grant such = visitation=20 rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest of the = child."=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3) (emphases added). That language effectively = permits any=20 third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent = concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court = review. Once=20 the visitation petition has been filed in court and the matter is = placed=20 before a judge, a parent's decision that visitation would not be = in the=20 child's best interest is accorded no deference. Section = 26.10.160(3)=20 contains no requirement that a court accord the parent's decision = any=20 presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. Instead, the = Washington=20 statute places the best-interest determination solely in the hands = of the=20 judge. Should the judge disagree with the parent's estimation of = the=20 child's best interests, the judge's view necessarily prevails. = Thus, in=20 practical effect, in the State of Washington a court can disregard = and=20 overturn any decision by a fit custodial parent concerning = visitation=20 whenever a third party affected by the decision files a visitation = petition, based solely on the judge's determination of the child's = best=20 interests. The Washington Supreme Court had the opportunity to = give=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3) a narrower reading, but it declined to do so. = See, e.g., 137=20 Wash. 2d, at 5, 969 P. 2d, at 23 ("[The statute] allow[s] any = person, at=20 any time, to petition for visitation without regard to = relationship to the=20 child, without regard to changed circumstances, and without regard = to=20 harm"); id., at 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 ("[The statute] allow[s] `any = person'=20 to petition for forced visitation of a child at `any time' with = the only=20 requirement being that the visitation serve the best interest of = the=20 child").
[53]	Turning to the facts of this case, the record reveals that the=20 Superior Court's order was based on precisely the type of mere=20 disagreement we have just described and nothing more. The Superior = Court's=20 order was not founded on any special factors that might justify = the=20 State's interference with Granville's fundamental right to make = decisions=20 concerning the rearing of her two daughters. To be sure, this case = involves a visitation petition filed by grandparents soon after = the death=20 of their son -- the father of Isabelle and Natalie -- but the = combination=20 of several factors here compels our conclusion that = =C2=A726.10.160(3), as=20 applied, exceeded the bounds of the Due Process = Clause.
[54]	First, the Troxels did not allege, and no court has found, that=20 Granville was an unfit parent. That aspect of the case is = important, for=20 there is a presumption that fit parents act in the best interests = of their=20 children. As this Court explained in Parham:
[55]	"[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a = child=20 is the mere creature of the State and, on the contrary, asserted = that=20 parents generally have the right, coupled with the high duty, to = recognize=20 and prepare [their children] for additional obligations. ... The = law's=20 concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess = what a=20 child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment = required=20 for making life's difficult decisions. More important, = historically it has=20 recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in = the best=20 interests of their children." 442 U. S., at 602 (alteration in = original)=20 (internal quotation marks and citations = omitted).
[56]	Accordingly, so long as a parent adequately cares for his or her = children (i.e., is fit), there will normally be no reason for the = State to=20 inject itself into the private realm of the family to further = question the=20 ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the = rearing=20 of that parent's children. See, e.g., Flores, 507 U. S., at=20 304.
[57]	The problem here is not that the Washington Superior Court = intervened,=20 but that when it did so, it gave no special weight at all to = Granville's=20 determination of her daughters' best interests. More importantly, = it=20 appears that the Superior Court applied exactly the opposite = presumption.=20 In reciting its oral ruling after the conclusion of closing = arguments, the=20 Superior Court judge explained:
[58]	"The burden is to show that it is in the best interest of the = children=20 to have some visitation and some quality time with their = grandparents. I=20 think in most situations a commonsensical approach [is that] it is = normally in the best interest of the children to spend quality = time with=20 the grandparent, unless the grandparent, [sic] there are some = issues or=20 problems involved wherein the grandparents, their lifestyles are = going to=20 impact adversely upon the children. That certainly isn't the case = here=20 from what I can tell." Verbatim Report of Proceedings in In re = Troxel, No.=20 93-3-00650-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., Dec. 14, 19, 1994), p. 213 = (hereinafter=20 Verbatim Report).
[59]	The judge's comments suggest that he presumed the grandparents'=20 request should be granted unless the children would be "impact[ed] = adversely." In effect, the judge placed on Granville, the fit = custodial=20 parent, the burden of disproving that visitation would be in the = best=20 interest of her daughters. The judge reiterated moments later: "I = think=20 [visitation with the Troxels] would be in the best interest of the = children and I haven't been shown it is not in [the] best interest = of the=20 children." Id., at 214.
[60]	The decisional framework employed by the Superior Court directly = contravened the traditional presumption that a fit parent will act = in the=20 best interest of his or her child. See Parham, supra, at 602. In = that=20 respect, the court's presumption failed to provide any protection = for=20 Granville's fundamental constitutional right to make decisions = concerning=20 the rearing of her own daughters. Cf., e.g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. = =C2=A73104(e)=20 (West 1994) (rebuttable presumption that grandparent visitation is = not in=20 child's best interest if parents agree that visitation rights = should not=20 be granted); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann., Tit. 19A, =C2=A71803(3) (1998) = (court may=20 award grandparent visitation if in best interest of child and = "would not=20 significantly interfere with any parent-child relationship or with = the=20 parent's rightful authority over the child"); Minn. Stat.=20 =C2=A7257.022(2)(a)(2) (1998) (court may award grandparent = visitation if in=20 best interest of child and "such visitation would not interfere = with the=20 parent-child relationship"); Neb. Rev. Stat. =C2=A743-1802(2) = (1998) (court=20 must find "by clear and convincing evidence" that grandparent = visitation=20 "will not adversely interfere with the parent-child = relationship"); R. I.=20 Gen. Laws =C2=A715-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999) (grandparent must = rebut, by=20 clear and convincing evidence, presumption that parent's decision = to=20 refuse grandparent visitation was reasonable); Utah Code Ann.=20 =C2=A730-5-2(2)(e) (1998) (same); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N. W. 2d 285, = 291-292 (N.=20 D. 1999) (holding North Dakota grandparent visitation statute=20 unconstitutional because State has no "compelling interest in = presuming=20 visitation rights of grandparents to an unmarried minor are in the = child's=20 best interests and forcing parents to accede to court-ordered=20 grandparental visitation unless the parents are first able to = prove such=20 visitation is not in the best interests of their minor child"). In = an=20 ideal world, parents might always seek to cultivate the bonds = between=20 grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to say, however, = our world=20 is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an=20 intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific = case is=20 for the parent to make in the first instance. And, if a fit = parent's=20 decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial = review, the=20 court must accord at least some special weight to the parent's own = determination.
[61]	Finally, we note that there is no allegation that Granville ever = sought to cut off visitation entirely. Rather, the present dispute = originated when Granville informed the Troxels that she would = prefer to=20 restrict their visitation with Isabelle and Natalie to one short = visit per=20 month and special holidays. See 87 Wash. App., at 133, 940 P. 2d, = at 699;=20 Verbatim Report 12. In the Superior Court proceedings Granville = did not=20 oppose visitation but instead asked that the duration of any = visitation=20 order be shorter than that requested by the Troxels. While the = Troxels=20 requested two weekends per month and two full weeks in the summer, = Granville asked the Superior Court to order only one day of = visitation per=20 month (with no overnight stay) and participation in the Granville = family's=20 holiday celebrations. See 87 Wash. App., at 133, 940 P. 2d, at = 699;=20 Verbatim Report 9 ("Right off the bat we'd like to say that our = position=20 is that grandparent visitation is in the best interest of the = children. It=20 is a matter of how much and how it is going to be structured") = (opening=20 statement by Granville's attorney). The Superior Court gave no = weight to=20 Granville's having assented to visitation even before the filing = of any=20 visitation petition or subsequent court intervention. The court = instead=20 rejected Granville's proposal and settled on a middle ground, = ordering one=20 weekend of visitation per month, one week in the summer, and time = on both=20 of the petitioning grandparents' birthdays. See 87 Wash. App., at = 133-134,=20 940 P. 2d, at 699; Verbatim Report 216-221. Significantly, many = other=20 States expressly provide by statute that courts may not award = visitation=20 unless a parent has denied (or unreasonably denied) visitation to = the=20 concerned third party. See, e.g., Miss. Code Ann. = =C2=A793-16-3(2)(a) (1994)=20 (court must find that "the parent or custodian of the child = unreasonably=20 denied the grandparent visitation rights with the child"); Ore. = Rev. Stat.=20 =C2=A7109.121(1)(a)(B) (1997) (court may award visitation if the = "custodian of=20 the child has denied the grandparent reasonable opportunity to = visit the=20 child"); R. I. Gen. Laws =C2=A715-5-24.3(a)(2)(iii)-(iv) (Supp. = 1999) (court=20 must find that parents prevented grandparent from visiting = grandchild and=20 that "there is no other way the petitioner is able to visit his or = her=20 grandchild without court intervention").
[62]	Considered together with the Superior Court's reasons for = awarding=20 visitation to the Troxels, the combination of these factors = demonstrates=20 that the visitation order in this case was an unconstitutional=20 infringement on Granville's fundamental right to make decisions = concerning=20 the care, custody, and control of her two daughters. The = Washington=20 Superior Court failed to accord the determination of Granville, a = fit=20 custodial parent, any material weight. In fact, the Superior Court = made=20 only two formal findings in support of its visitation order. = First, the=20 Troxels "are part of a large, central, loving family, all located = in this=20 area, and the [Troxels] can provide opportunities for the children = in the=20 areas of cousins and music." App. 70a. Second, "[t]he children = would be=20 benefitted from spending quality time with the [Troxels], provided = that=20 that time is balanced with time with the childrens' [sic] nuclear = family."=20 Ibid. These slender findings, in combination with the court's = announced=20 presumption in favor of grandparent visitation and its failure to = accord=20 significant weight to Granville's already having offered = meaningful=20 visitation to the Troxels, show that this case involves nothing = more than=20 a simple disagreement between the Washington Superior Court and = Granville=20 concerning her children's best interests. The Superior Court's = announced=20 reason for ordering one week of visitation in the summer = demonstrates our=20 conclusion well: "I look back on some personal experiences ... . = We always=20 spen[t] as kids a week with one set of grandparents and another = set of=20 grandparents, [and] it happened to work out in our family that = [it] turned=20 out to be an enjoyable experience. Maybe that can, in this family, = if that=20 is how it works out." Verbatim Report 220-221. As we have = explained, the=20 Due Process Clause does not permit a State to infringe on the = fundamental=20 right of parents to make childrearing decisions simply because a = state=20 judge believes a "better" decision could be made. Neither the = Washington=20 nonparental visitation statute generally -- which places no limits = on=20 either the persons who may petition for visitation or the = circumstances in=20 which such a petition may be granted -- nor the Superior Court in = this=20 specific case required anything more. Accordingly, we hold that=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3), as applied in this case, is = unconstitutional.
[63]	Because we rest our decision on the sweeping breadth of = =C2=A726.10.160(3)=20 and the application of that broad, unlimited power in this case, = we do not=20 consider the primary constitutional question passed on by the = Washington=20 Supreme Court -- whether the Due Process Clause requires all = nonparental=20 visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm = to the=20 child as a condition precedent to granting visitation. We do not, = and need=20 not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process = right in=20 the visitation context. In this respect, we agree with Justice = Kennedy=20 that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation = turns=20 on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that = the=20 constitutional protections in this area are best "elaborated with = care."=20 Post, at 9 (dissenting opinion). Because much state-court = adjudication in=20 this context occurs on a case-by-case basis, we would be hesitant = to hold=20 that specific nonparental visitation statutes violate the Due = Process=20 Clause as a per se matter.*fn1 See, e.g., Fairbanks v. McCarter, 330 Md. = 39, 49-50,=20 622 A. 2d 121, 126-127 (1993) (interpreting best-interest standard = in=20 grandparent visitation statute normally to require court's = consideration=20 of certain factors); Williams v. Williams, 256 Va. 19, 501 S. E. = 2d 417,=20 418 (1998) (interpreting Virginia nonparental visitation statute = to=20 require finding of harm as condition precedent to awarding=20 visitation).
[64]	Justice Stevens criticizes our reliance on what he characterizes = as=20 merely "a guess" about the Washington courts' interpretation of=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3). Post, at 2. Justice Kennedy likewise states = that "[m]ore=20 specific guidance should await a case in which a State's highest = court has=20 considered all of the facts in the course of elaborating the = protection=20 afforded to parents by the laws of the State and by the = Constitution=20 itself." Post, at 10. We respectfully disagree. There is no need = to=20 hypothesize about how the Washington courts might apply = =C2=A726.10.160(3)=20 because the Washington Superior Court did apply the statute in = this very=20 case. Like the Washington Supreme Court, then, we are presented = with an=20 actual visitation order and the reasons why the Superior Court = believed=20 entry of the order was appropriate in this case. Faced with the = Superior=20 Court's application of =C2=A726.10.160(3) to Granville and her = family, the=20 Washington Supreme Court chose not to give the statute a narrower=20 construction. Rather, that court gave =C2=A726.10.160(3) a literal = and=20 expansive interpretation. As we have explained, that broad = construction=20 plainly encompassed the Superior Court's application of the = statute. See=20 supra, at 8-9.
[65]	There is thus no reason to remand the case for further = proceedings in=20 the Washington Supreme Court. As Justice Kennedy recognizes, the = burden of=20 litigating a domestic relations proceeding can itself be "so = disruptive of=20 the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a = custodial=20 parent to make certain basic determinations for the child's = welfare=20 becomes implicated." Post at 9. In this case, the litigation costs = incurred by Granville on her trip through the Washington court = system and=20 to this Court are without a doubt already substantial. As we have=20 explained, it is apparent that the entry of the visitation order = in this=20 case violated the Constitution. We should say so now, without = forcing the=20 parties into additional litigation that would further burden = Granville's=20 parental right. We therefore hold that the application of = =C2=A726.10.160(3) to=20 Granville and her family violated her due process right to make = decisions=20 concerning the care, custody, and control of her = daughters.
[66]	Accordingly, the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court is=20 affirmed.
[67]	It is so ordered.
[68]	Justice Souter, concurring in the judgment.
[69]	I concur in the judgment affirming the decision of the Supreme = Court=20 of Washington, whose facial invalidation of its own state statute = is=20 consistent with this Court's prior cases addressing the = substantive=20 interests at stake. I would say no more. The issues that might = well be=20 presented by reviewing a decision addressing the specific = application of=20 the state statute by the trial court, ante, at 9-14, are not = before us and=20 do not call for turning any fresh furrows in the "treacherous = field" of=20 substantive due process. Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, = 502=20 (1977) (opinion of Powell, J.).
[70]	The Supreme Court of Washington invalidated its state statute = based on=20 the text of the statute alone, not its application to any = particular=20 case.*fn2 Its ruling rested on two independently = sufficient=20 grounds: the failure of the statute to require harm to the child = to=20 justify a disputed visitation order, In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d, 1, = 17, 969=20 P. 2d 21, 29 (1998), and the statute's authorization of "any = person" at=20 "any time" to petition and to receive visitation rights subject = only to a=20 free-ranging best-interests-of-the-child standard, id., at 20-21, = 969 P.=20 2d, at 30-31. Ante, at 4. I see no error in the second reason, = that=20 because the state statute authorizes any person at any time to = request=20 (and a judge to award) visitation rights, subject only to the = State's=20 particular best-interests standard, the state statute sweeps too = broadly=20 and is unconstitutional on its face. Consequently, there is no = need to=20 decide whether harm is required or to consider the precise scope = of the=20 parent's right or its necessary protections.
[71]	We have long recognized that a parent's interests in the = nurture,=20 upbringing, companionship, care, and custody of children are = generally=20 protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. = See,=20 e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. = Society=20 of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U. = S. 645,=20 651 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232 (1972); = Quilloin v.=20 Walcott, 434 U. S. 246, 255 (1978); Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. = 584, 602=20 (1979); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753 (1982); Washington = v.=20 Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 720 (1997). As we first acknowledged in = Meyer,=20 the right of parents to "bring up children," 262 U. S., at 399, = and "to=20 control the education of their own" is protected by the = Constitution, id.,=20 at 401. See also Glucksberg, supra, at 761 (Souter, J., concurring = in=20 judgment).
[72]	On the basis of this settled principle, the Supreme Court of=20 Washington invalidated its statute because it authorized a = contested=20 visitation order at the intrusive behest of any person at any time = subject=20 only to a best-interests-of-the-child standard. In construing the = statute,=20 the state court explained that the "any person" at "any time" = language was=20 to be read literally, at 137 Wash. 2d, at 10-11, 969 P. 2d, at = 25-27, and=20 that "[m]ost notably the statut[e] do[es] not require the = petitioner to=20 establish that he or she has a substantial relationship with the = child,"=20 id., at 20-21, 969 P. 2d, at 31. Although the statute speaks of = granting=20 visitation rights whenever "visitation may serve the best interest = of the=20 child," Wash. Rev. Code =C2=A726.10.160(3) (1994), the state court = authoritatively read this provision as placing hardly any limit on = a=20 court's discretion to award visitation rights. As the court = understood it,=20 the specific best-interests provision in the statute would allow a = court=20 to award visitation whenever it thought it could make a better = decision=20 than a child's parent had done. See 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. = 2d, at 31=20 ("It is not within the province of the state to make significant = decisions=20 concerning the custody of children merely because it could make a = `better'=20 decision").*fn3 On that basis in part, the Supreme Court of = Washington=20 invalidated the State's own statute: "Parents have a right to = limit=20 visitation of their children with third persons." Id., at 21, 969 = P. 2d,=20 at 31.
[73]	Our cases, it is true, have not set out exact metes and bounds = to the=20 protected interest of a parent in the relationship with his child, = but=20 Meyer's repeatedly recognized right of upbringing would be a sham = if it=20 failed to encompass the right to be free of judicially compelled=20 visitation by "any party" at "any time" a judge believed he "could = make a=20 `better' decision"fn4 than the objecting parent had done. The = strength of a=20 parent's interest in controlling a child's associates is as = obvious as the=20 influence of personal associations on the development of the = child's=20 social and moral character. Whether for good or for ill, adults = not only=20 influence but may indoctrinate children, and a choice about a = child's=20 social companions is not essentially different from the = designation of the=20 adults who will influence the child in school. Even a State's = considered=20 judgment about the preferable political and religious character of = schoolteachers is not entitled to prevail over a parent's choice = of=20 private school. Pierce, supra, at 535 ("The fundamental theory of = liberty=20 upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any = general power=20 of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept = instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere = creature=20 of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have = the right,=20 coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for = additional=20 obligations"). It would be anomalous, then, to subject a parent to = any=20 individual judge's choice of a child's associates from out of the = general=20 population merely because the judge might think himself more = enlightened=20 than the child's parent.fn5 To say the least (and as the Court implied = in Pierce),=20 parental choice in such matters is not merely a default rule in = the=20 absence of either governmental choice or the government's = designation of=20 an official with the power to choose for whatever reason and in = whatever=20 circumstances.
[74]	Since I do not question the power of a State's highest court to=20 construe its domestic statute and to apply a demanding standard = when=20 ruling on its facial constitutionality,*fn6 see Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 55, n. = 22 (1999)=20 (opinion of Stevens, J.), this for me is the end of the case. I = would=20 simply affirm the decision of the Supreme Court of Washington that = its=20 statute, authorizing courts to grant visitation rights to any = person at=20 any time, is unconstitutional. I therefore respectfully concur in = the=20 judgment.
[75]	Justice Thomas, concurring in the judgment.
[76]	I write separately to note that neither party has argued that = our=20 substantive due process cases were wrongly decided and that the = original=20 understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes judicial = enforcement of=20 unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision. As a = result, I=20 express no view on the merits of this matter, and I understand the = plurality as well to leave the resolution of that issue for = another day.*fn7
[77]	Consequently, I agree with the plurality that this Court's = recognition=20 of a fundamental right of parents to direct the upbringing of = their=20 children resolves this case. Our decision in Pierce v. Society of = Sisters,=20 268 U. S. 510 (1925), holds that parents have a fundamental = constitutional=20 right to rear their children, including the right to determine who = shall=20 educate and socialize them. The opinions of the plurality, Justice = Kennedy, and Justice Souter recognize such a right, but curiously = none of=20 them articulates the appropriate standard of review. I would apply = strict=20 scrutiny to infringements of fundamental rights. Here, the State = of=20 Washington lacks even a legitimate governmental interest -- to say = nothing=20 of a compelling one -- in second-guessing a fit parent's decision=20 regarding visitation with third parties. On this basis, I would = affirm the=20 judgment below.
[78]	Justice Stevens, dissenting.
[79]	The Court today wisely declines to endorse either the holding or = the=20 reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington. In my opinion, the = Court=20 would have been even wiser to deny certiorari. Given the = problematic=20 character of the trial court's decision and the uniqueness of the=20 Washington statute, there was no pressing need to review a State = Supreme=20 Court decision that merely requires the state legislature to draft = a=20 better statute.
[80]	Having decided to address the merits, however, the Court should = begin=20 by recognizing that the State Supreme Court rendered a federal=20 constitutional judgment holding a state law invalid on its face. = In light=20 of that judgment, I believe that we should confront the federal = questions=20 presented directly. For the Washington statute is not made = facially=20 invalid either because it may be invoked by too many hypothetical=20 plaintiffs, or because it leaves open the possibility that someone = may be=20 permitted to sustain a relationship with a child without having to = prove=20 that serious harm to the child would otherwise = result.
[81]	I.
[82]	In response to Tommie Granville's federal constitutional = challenge,=20 the State Supreme Court broadly held that Wash. Rev. Code = =C2=A726.10.160(3)=20 (Supp. 1996) was invalid on its face under the Federal = Constitution.*fn8 Despite the nature of this judgment, Justice = O'Connor=20 would hold that the Washington visitation statute violated the Due = Process=20 Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment only as applied. Ante, at 6, 8, = 14-15.=20 I agree with Justice Souter, ante, at 1, and n. 1 (opinion = concurring in=20 judgment), that this approach is untenable.
[83]	The task of reviewing a trial court's application of a state = statute=20 to the particular facts of a case is one that should be performed = in the=20 first instance by the state appellate courts. In this case, = because of=20 their views of the Federal Constitution, the Washington state = appeals=20 courts have yet to decide whether the trial court's findings were = adequate=20 under the statute.fn9 Any as-applied critique of the trial court's = judgment=20 that this Court might offer could only be based upon a guess about = the=20 state courts' application of that State's statute, and an = independent=20 assessment of the facts in this case -- both judgments that we are = ill-suited and ill-advised to make.fn10
[84]	While I thus agree with Justice Souter in this respect, I do not = agree=20 with his conclusion that the State Supreme Court made a definitive = construction of the visitation statute that necessitates the=20 constitutional conclusion he would draw.fn11 As I read the State Supreme Court's = opinion, In re=20 Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 19-20, 969 P. 2d 21, 30-31 (1998), its=20 interpretation of the Federal Constitution made it unnecessary to = adopt a=20 definitive construction of the statutory text, or, critically, to = decide=20 whether the statute had been correctly applied in this case. In=20 particular, the state court gave no content to the phrase, "best = interest=20 of the child," Wash. Rev. Code =C2=A726.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996) -- = content that=20 might well be gleaned from that State's own statutes or decisional = law=20 employing the same phrase in different contexts, and from the = myriad other=20 state statutes and court decisions at least nominally applying the = same=20 standard.fn12 Thus, I believe that Justice Souter's = conclusion=20 that the statute unconstitutionally imbues state trial court = judges with "=20 `too much discretion in every case,' " ante, at 4, n. 3 (opinion=20 concurring in judgment) (quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, = 71=20 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring)), is premature.
[85]	We are thus presented with the unconstrued terms of a state = statute=20 and a State Supreme Court opinion that, in my view, significantly=20 misstates the effect of the Federal Constitution upon any = construction of=20 that statute. Given that posture, I believe the Court should = identify and=20 correct the two flaws in the reasoning of the state court's = majority=20 opinion, and remand for further review of the trial court's = disposition of=20 this specific case.
[86]	II.
[87]	In my view, the State Supreme Court erred in its federal=20 constitutional analysis because neither the provision granting = "any=20 person" the right to petition the court for visitation, 137 Wash. = 2d, at=20 20, 969 P. 2d, at 30, nor the absence of a provision requiring a=20 "threshold ... finding of harm to the child," ibid., provides a = sufficient=20 basis for holding that the statute is invalid in all its = applications. I=20 believe that a facial challenge should fail whenever a statute has = "a=20 `plainly legitimate sweep,' " Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. = 702,=20 739-740 and n. 7 (1997) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment).*fn13 Under the Washington statute, there are = plainly any=20 number of cases -- indeed, one suspects, the most common to arise = -- in=20 which the "person" among "any" seeking visitation is a = once-custodial=20 caregiver, an intimate relation, or even a genetic parent. Even = the Court=20 would seem to agree that in many circumstances, it would be=20 constitutionally permissible for a court to award some visitation = of a=20 child to a parent or previous caregiver in cases of parental = separation or=20 divorce, cases of disputed custody, cases involving temporary = foster care=20 or guardianship, and so forth. As the statute plainly sweeps in a = great=20 deal of the permissible, the State Supreme Court majority = incorrectly=20 concluded that a statute authorizing "any person" to file a = petition=20 seeking visitation privileges would invariably run afoul of the = Fourteenth=20 Amendment.
[88]	The second key aspect of the Washington Supreme Court's holding = --=20 that the Federal Constitution requires a showing of actual or = potential=20 "harm" to the child before a court may order visitation continued = over a=20 parent's objections -- finds no support in this Court's case law. = While,=20 as the Court recognizes, the Federal Constitution certainly = protects the=20 parent-child relationship from arbitrary impairment by the State, = see=20 infra, at 7-8 we have never held that the parent's liberty = interest in=20 this relationship is so inflexible as to establish a rigid = constitutional=20 shield, protecting every arbitrary parental decision from any = challenge=20 absent a threshold finding of harm.*fn14 The presumption that parental decisions = generally=20 serve the best interests of their children is sound, and clearly = in the=20 normal case the parent's interest is paramount. But even a fit = parent is=20 capable of treating a child like a mere = possession.
[89]	Cases like this do not present a bipolar struggle between the = parents=20 and the State over who has final authority to determine what is in = a=20 child's best interests. There is at a minimum a third individual, = whose=20 interests are implicated in every case to which the statute = applies -- the=20 child.
[90]	It has become standard practice in our substantive due process=20 jurisprudence to begin our analysis with an identification of the=20 "fundamental" liberty interests implicated by the challenged state = action.=20 See, e.g., ante, at 6-8 (opinion of O'Connor, J.); Washington v.=20 Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702 (1997); Planned Parenthood of = Southeastern Pa.=20 v. Casey, 505 U. S. 833 (1992). My colleagues are of course = correct to=20 recognize that the right of a parent to maintain a relationship = with his=20 or her child is among the interests included most often in the=20 constellation of liberties protected through the Fourteenth = Amendment.=20 Ante, at 6-8 (opinion of O'Connor, J.). Our cases leave no doubt = that=20 parents have a fundamental liberty interest in caring for and = guiding=20 their children, and a corresponding privacy interest -- absent = exceptional=20 circumstances -- in doing so without the undue interference of = strangers=20 to them and to their child. Moreover, and critical in this case, = our cases=20 applying this principle have explained that with this = constitutional=20 liberty comes a presumption (albeit a rebuttable one) that = "natural bonds=20 of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their = children."=20 Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); see also Casey, 505 = U.S., at=20 895; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 759 (1982) (State may not = presume,=20 at factfinding stage of parental rights termination proceeding, = that=20 interests of parent and child diverge); see also ante, at 9-10 = (opinion of=20 O'Connor, J.).
[91]	Despite this Court's repeated recognition of these significant=20 parental liberty interests, these interests have never been seen = to be=20 without limits. In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U. S. 248 (1983), for = example,=20 this Court held that a putative biological father who had never=20 established an actual relationship with his child did not have a=20 constitutional right to notice of his child's adoption by the man = who had=20 married the child's mother. As this Court had recognized in an = earlier=20 case, a parent's liberty interests " `do not spring full-blown = from the=20 biological connection between parent and child. They require = relationships=20 more enduring.' " Id., at 260 (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U. = S. 380,=20 397 (1979)).
[92]	Conversely, in Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U. S. 110 (1989), = this=20 Court concluded that despite both biological parenthood and an = established=20 relationship with a young child, a father's due process liberty = interest=20 in maintaining some connection with that child was not = sufficiently=20 powerful to overcome a state statutory presumption that the = husband of the=20 child's mother was the child's parent. As a result of the = presumption, the=20 biological father could be denied even visitation with the child = because,=20 as a matter of state law, he was not a "parent." A plurality of = this Court=20 there recognized that the parental liberty interest was a = function, not=20 simply of "isolated factors" such as biology and intimate = connection, but=20 of the broader and apparently independent interest in family. See, = e.g. .=20 id., at 123; see also Lehr, 463 U. S., at 261; Smith v. = Organization of=20 Foster Families For Equality & Reform, 431 U. S. 816, 842-847 = (1977);=20 Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494, 498-504 = (1977).
[93]	A parent's rights with respect to her child have thus never been = regarded as absolute, but rather are limited by the existence of = an=20 actual, developed relationship with a child, and are tied to the = presence=20 or absence of some embodiment of family. These limitations have = arisen,=20 not simply out of the definition of parenthood itself, but because = of this=20 Court's assumption that a parent's interests in a child must be = balanced=20 against the State's long-recognized interests as parens patriae, = see,=20 e.g., Reno v. Flores, 507 U. S. 292, 303-304 (1993); Santosky v. = Kramer,=20 455 U. S., at 766; Parham, 442 U.S., at 605; Prince v. = Massachusetts, 321=20 U. S. 158, 166 (1944), and, critically, the child's own = complementary=20 interest in preserving relationships that serve her welfare and=20 protection, Santosky, 455 U. S., at 760.
[94]	While this Court has not yet had occasion to elucidate the = nature of a=20 child's liberty interests in preserving established familial or=20 family-like bonds, 491 U. S., at 130 (reserving the question), it = seems to=20 me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and families have=20 fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate = relationships,=20 so, too, do children have these interests, and so, too, must their = interests be balanced in the equation.fn15 At a minimum, our prior cases recognizing = that=20 children are, generally speaking, constitutionally protected = actors=20 require that this Court reject any suggestion that when it comes = to=20 parental rights, children are so much chattel. See ante, at 5-6 = (opinion=20 of O'Connor, J.) (describing States' recognition of "an = independent=20 third-party interest in a child"). The constitutional protection = against=20 arbitrary state interference with parental rights should not be = extended=20 to prevent the States from protecting children against the = arbitrary=20 exercise of parental authority that is not in fact motivated by an = interest in the welfare of the child.fn16
[95]	This is not, of course, to suggest that a child's liberty = interest in=20 maintaining contact with a particular individual is to be treated=20 invariably as on a par with that child's parents' contrary = interests.=20 Because our substantive due process case law includes a strong = presumption=20 that a parent will act in the best interest of her child, it would = be=20 necessary, were the state appellate courts actually to confront a=20 challenge to the statute as applied, to consider whether the trial = court's=20 assessment of the "best interest of the child" incorporated that=20 presumption. Neither would I decide whether the trial court = applied=20 Washington's statute in a constitutional way in this case, = although, as I=20 have explained, n. 3, supra, I think the outcome of this = determination is=20 far from clear. For the purpose of a facial challenge like this, I = think=20 it safe to assume that trial judges usually give great deference = to=20 parents' wishes, and I am not persuaded otherwise = here.
[96]	But presumptions notwithstanding, we should recognize that there = may=20 be circumstances in which a child has a stronger interest at stake = than=20 mere protection from serious harm caused by the termination of = visitation=20 by a "person" other than a parent. The almost infinite variety of = family=20 relationships that pervade our ever-changing society strongly = counsel=20 against the creation by this Court of a constitutional rule that = treats a=20 biological parent's liberty interest in the care and supervision = of her=20 child as an isolated right that may be exercised arbitrarily. It = is=20 indisputably the business of the States, rather than a federal = court=20 employing a national standard, to assess in the first instance the = relative importance of the conflicting interests that give rise to = disputes such as this.*fn17 Far from guaranteeing that parents' = interests will=20 be trammeled in the sweep of cases arising under the statute, the=20 Washington law merely gives an individual -- with whom a child may = have an=20 established relationship -- the procedural right to ask the State = to act=20 as arbiter, through the entirely well-known best-interests = standard,=20 between the parent's protected interests and the child's. It seems = clear=20 to me that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment = leaves room=20 for States to consider the impact on a child of possibly arbitrary = parental decisions that neither serve nor are motivated by the = best=20 interests of the child.
[97]	Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
[98]	Justice Scalia, dissenting.
[99]	In my view, a right of parents to direct the upbringing of their = children is among the "unalienable Rights" with which the = Declaration of=20 Independence proclaims "all Men ... are endowed by their Creator." = And in=20 my view that right is also among the "othe[r] [rights] retained by = the=20 people" which the Ninth Amendment says the Constitution's = enumeration of=20 rights "shall not be construed to deny or disparage." The = Declaration of=20 Independence, however, is not a legal prescription conferring = powers upon=20 the courts; and the Constitution's refusal to "deny or disparage" = other=20 rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, and even = farther=20 removed from authorizing judges to identify what they might be, = and to=20 enforce the judges' list against laws duly enacted by the people.=20 Consequently, while I would think it entirely compatible with the=20 commitment to representative democracy set forth in the founding = documents=20 to argue, in legislative chambers or in electoral campaigns, that = the=20 state has no power to interfere with parents' authority over the = rearing=20 of their children, I do not believe that the power which the = Constitution=20 confers upon me as a judge entitles me to deny legal effect to = laws that=20 (in my view) infringe upon what is (in my view) that unenumerated=20 right.
[100]	Only three holdings of this Court rest in whole or in part upon = a=20 substantive constitutional right of parents to direct the = upbringing of=20 their children*fn18 -- two of them from an era rich in = substantive due=20 process holdings that have since been repudiated. See Meyer v. = Nebraska,=20 262 U. S. 390, 399, 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 = U. S.=20 510, 534-535 (1925); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, 232-233 = (1972).=20 Cf. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U. S. 379 (1937) = (overruling=20 Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U. S. 525 (1923)). The = sheer=20 diversity of today's opinions persuades me that the theory of = unenumerated=20 parental rights underlying these three cases has small claim to = stare=20 decisis protection. A legal principle that can be thought to = produce such=20 diverse outcomes in the relatively simple case before us here is = not a=20 legal principle that has induced substantial reliance. While I = would not=20 now overrule those earlier cases (that has not been urged), = neither would=20 I extend the theory upon which they rested to this new=20 context.
[101]	Judicial vindication of "parental rights" under a Constitution = that=20 does not even mention them requires (as Justice Kennedy's opinion = rightly=20 points out) not only a judicially crafted definition of parents, = but also=20 --unless, as no one believes, the parental rights are to be = absolute=20 --judicially approved assessments of "harm to the child" and = judicially=20 defined gradations of other persons (grandparents, extended = family,=20 adoptive family in an adoption later found to be invalid, = long-term=20 guardians, etc.) who may have some claim against the wishes of the = parents. If we embrace this unenumerated right, I think it obvious = --=20 whether we affirm or reverse the judgment here, or remand as = Justice=20 Stevens or Justice Kennedy would do -- that we will be ushering in = a new=20 regime of judicially prescribed, and federally prescribed, family = law. I=20 have no reason to believe that federal judges will be better at = this than=20 state legislatures; and state legislatures have the great = advantages of=20 doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to correct = their=20 mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the people.*fn19
[102]	For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment = below.
[103]	Justice Kennedy, dissenting.
[104]	The Supreme Court of Washington has determined that petitioners=20 Jenifer and Gary Troxel have standing under state law to seek=20 court-ordered visitation with their grandchildren, notwithstanding = the=20 objections of the children's parent, respondent Tommie Granville. = The=20 statute relied upon provides:
[105]	"Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any = time=20 including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may = order=20 visitation rights for any person when visitation may serve the = best=20 interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of=20 circumstances." Wash. Rev. Code =C2=A726.10.160(3) = (1994).
[106]	After acknowledging this statutory right to sue for visitation, = the=20 State Supreme Court invalidated the statute as violative of the = United=20 States Constitution, because it interfered with a parent's right = to raise=20 his or her child free from unwarranted interference. In re Smith, = 137=20 Wash. 2d 1, 969 P. 2d 21 (1998). Although parts of the court's = decision=20 may be open to differing interpretations, it seems to be agreed = that the=20 court invalidated the statute on its face, ruling it a=20 nullity.
[107]	The first flaw the State Supreme Court found in the statute is = that it=20 allows an award of visitation to a non-parent without a finding = that harm=20 to the child would result if visitation were withheld; and the = second is=20 that the statute allows any person to seek visitation at any time. = In my=20 view the first theory is too broad to be correct, as it appears to = contemplate that the best interests of the child standard may not = be=20 applied in any visitation case. I acknowledge the distinct = possibility=20 that visitation cases may arise where, considering the absence of = other=20 protection for the parent under state laws and procedures, the = best=20 interests of the child standard would give insufficient protection = to the=20 parent's constitutional right to raise the child without undue=20 intervention by the state; but it is quite a different matter to = say, as I=20 understand the Supreme Court of Washington to have said, that a = harm to=20 the child standard is required in every = instance.
[108]	Given the error I see in the State Supreme Court's central = conclusion=20 that the best interests of the child standard is never appropriate = in=20 third-party visitation cases, that court should have the first = opportunity=20 to reconsider this case. I would remand the case to the state = court for=20 further proceedings. If it then found the statute has been applied = in an=20 unconstitutional manner because the best interests of the child = standard=20 gives insufficient protection to a parent under the circumstances = of this=20 case, or if it again declared the statute a nullity because the = statute=20 seems to allow any person at all to seek visitation at any time, = the=20 decision would present other issues which may or may not warrant = further=20 review in this Court. These include not only the protection the=20 Constitution gives parents against state-ordered visitation but = also the=20 extent to which federal rules for facial challenges to statutes = control in=20 state courts. These matters, however, should await some further = case. The=20 judgment now under review should be vacated and remanded on the = sole=20 ground that the harm ruling that was so central to the Supreme = Court of=20 Washington's decision was error, given its broad=20 formulation.
[109]	Turning to the question whether harm to the child must be the=20 controlling standard in every visitation proceeding, there is a = beginning=20 point that commands general, perhaps unanimous, agreement in our = separate=20 opinions: As our case law has developed, the custodial parent has = a=20 constitutional right to determine, without undue interference by = the=20 state, how best to raise, nurture, and educate the child. The = parental=20 right stems from the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause = of the=20 Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, = 399,=20 401 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-535 = (1925);=20 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U. S. 158, 166 (1944); Stanley v. = Illinois,=20 405 U. S. 645, 651-652 (1972); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U. S. 205, = 232-233=20 (1972); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U. S. 745, 753-754 (1982). Pierce = and=20 Meyer, had they been decided in recent times, may well have been = grounded=20 upon First Amendment principles protecting freedom of speech, = belief, and=20 religion. Their formulation and subsequent interpretation have = been quite=20 different, of course; and they long have been interpreted to have = found in=20 Fourteenth Amendment concepts of liberty an independent right of = the=20 parent in the "custody, care and nurture of the child," free from = state=20 intervention. Prince, supra, at 166. The principle exists, then, = in broad=20 formulation; yet courts must use considerable restraint, including = careful=20 adherence to the incremental instruction given by the precise = facts of=20 particular cases, as they seek to give further and more precise = definition=20 to the right.
[110]	The State Supreme Court sought to give content to the parent's = right=20 by announcing a categorical rule that third parties who seek = visitation=20 must always prove the denial of visitation would harm the child. = After=20 reviewing some of the relevant precedents, the Supreme Court of = Washington=20 concluded " `[t]he requirement of harm is the sole protection that = parents=20 have against pervasive state interference in the parenting = process.' " In=20 re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d, at 19-20, 969 P. 2d, at 30 (quoting Hawk = v. Hawk,=20 855 S. W. 2d 573, 580 (Tenn. 1993)). For that reason, "[s]hort of=20 preventing harm to the child," the court considered the best = interests of=20 the child to be "insufficient to serve as a compelling state = interest=20 overruling a parent's fundamental rights." In re Smith, supra, at = 20, 969=20 P. 2d, at 30.
[111]	While it might be argued as an abstract matter that in some = sense the=20 child is always harmed if his or her best interests are not = considered,=20 the law of domestic relations, as it has evolved to this point, = treats as=20 distinct the two standards, one harm to the child and the other = the best=20 interests of the child. The judgment of the Supreme Court of = Washington=20 rests on that assumption, and I, too, shall assume that there are = real and=20 consequential differences between the two = standards.
[112]	On the question whether one standard must always take precedence = over=20 the other in order to protect the right of the parent or parents, = "[o]ur=20 Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" do not give us = clear or=20 definitive answers. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U. S. 702, 721 = (1997).=20 The consensus among courts and commentators is that at least = through the=20 19th century there was no legal right of visitation; court-ordered = visitation appears to be a 20th-century phenomenon. See, e.g., 1 = D.=20 Kramer, Legal Rights of Children 124, 136 (2d ed. 1994); 2 J. = Atkinson,=20 Modern Child Custody Practice =C2=A78.10 (1986). A case often = cited as one of=20 the earliest visitation decisions, Succession of Reiss, 46 La. = Ann. 347,=20 353, 15 So. 151, 152 (1894), explained that "the obligation = ordinarily to=20 visit grandparents is moral and not legal" -- a conclusion which = appears=20 consistent with that of American common law jurisdictions of the = time.=20 Early 20th-century exceptions did occur, often in cases where a = relative=20 had acted in a parental capacity, or where one of a child's = parents had=20 died. See Douglass v. Merriman, 163 S. C. 210, 161 S. E. 452 = (1931)=20 (maternal grandparent awarded visitation with child when custody = was=20 awarded to father; mother had died); Solomon v. Solomon, 319 Ill. = App.=20 618, 49 N. E. 2d 807 (1943) (paternal grandparents could be given=20 visitation with child in custody of his mother when their son was=20 stationed abroad; case remanded for fitness hearing); Consaul v. = Consaul,=20 63 N. Y. S. 2d 688 (Sup. Ct. Jefferson Cty. 1946) (paternal = grandparents=20 awarded visitation with child in custody of his mother; father had = become=20 incompetent). As a general matter, however, contemporary = state-court=20 decisions acknowledge that "[h]istorically, grandparents had no = legal=20 right of visitation," Campbell v. Campbell, 896 P. 2d 635, 642, n. = 15=20 (Utah App. 1995), and it is safe to assume other third parties = would have=20 fared no better in court.
[113]	To say that third parties have had no historical right to = petition for=20 visitation does not necessarily imply, as the Supreme Court of = Washington=20 concluded, that a parent has a constitutional right to prevent = visitation=20 in all cases not involving harm. True, this Court has acknowledged = that=20 States have the authority to intervene to prevent harm to = children, see,=20 e.g., Prince, supra, at 168-169; Yoder, supra, at 233-234, but = that is not=20 the same as saying that a heightened harm to the child standard = must be=20 satisfied in every case in which a third party seeks a visitation = order.=20 It is also true that the law's traditional presumption has been = "that=20 natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best = interests of=20 their children," Parham v. J. R., 442 U. S. 584, 602 (1979); and = "[s]imply=20 because the decision of a parent is not agreeable to a child or = because it=20 involves risks does not automatically transfer the power to make = that=20 decision from the parents to some agency or officer of the state," = id., at=20 603. The State Supreme Court's conclusion that the Constitution = forbids=20 the application of the best interests of the child standard in any = visitation proceeding, however, appears to rest upon assumptions = the=20 Constitution does not require.
[114]	My principal concern is that the holding seems to proceed from = the=20 assumption that the parent or parents who resist visitation have = always=20 been the child's primary caregivers and that the third parties who = seek=20 visitation have no legitimate and established relationship with = the child.=20 That idea, in turn, appears influenced by the concept that the=20 conventional nuclear family ought to establish the visitation = standard for=20 every domestic relations case. As we all know, this is simply not = the=20 structure or prevailing condition in many households. See, e.g., = Moore v.=20 East Cleveland, 431 U. S. 494 (1977). For many boys and girls a=20 traditional family with two or even one permanent and caring = parent is=20 simply not the reality of their childhood. This may be so whether = their=20 childhood has been marked by tragedy or filled with considerable = happiness=20 and fulfillment.
[115]	Cases are sure to arise -- perhaps a substantial number of cases = -- in=20 which a third party, by acting in a caregiving role over a = significant=20 period of time, has developed a relationship with a child which is = not=20 necessarily subject to absolute parental veto. See Michael H. v. = Gerald=20 D., 491 U. S. 110 (1989) (putative natural father not entitled to = rebut=20 state law presumption that child born in a marriage is a child of = the=20 marriage); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U. S. 246 (1978) (best = interests=20 standard sufficient in adoption proceeding to protect interests of = natural=20 father who had not legitimated the child); see also Lehr v. = Robertson, 463=20 U. S. 248, 261 (1983) (" `[T]he importance of the familial = relationship,=20 to the individuals involved and to the society, stems from the = emotional=20 attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, = and from=20 the role it plays in `promot[ing] a way of life' through the = instruction=20 of children ... as well as from the fact of blood relationship.' " = (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality = &=20 Reform, 431 U. S. 816, 844 (1977) (in turn quoting Yoder, 406 U. = S., at=20 231-233))). Some pre-existing relationships, then, serve to = identify=20 persons who have a strong attachment to the child with the = concomitant=20 motivation to act in a responsible way to ensure the child's = welfare. As=20 the State Supreme Court was correct to acknowledge, those = relationships=20 can be so enduring that "in certain circumstances where a child = has=20 enjoyed a substantial relationship with a third person, = arbitrarily=20 depriving the child of the relationship could cause severe = psychological=20 harm to the child," In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d, at 20, 969 P. 2d, = at 30;=20 and harm to the adult may also ensue. In the design and = elaboration of=20 their visitation laws, States may be entitled to consider that = certain=20 relationships are such that to avoid the risk of harm, a best = interests=20 standard can be employed by their domestic relations courts in = some=20 circumstances.
[116]	Indeed, contemporary practice should give us some pause before=20 rejecting the best interests of the child standard in all = third-party=20 visitation cases, as the Washington court has done. The standard = has been=20 recognized for many years as a basic tool of domestic relations = law in=20 visitation proceedings. Since 1965 all 50 States have enacted a=20 third-party visitation statute of some sort. See ante, at 15, n.=20 (plurality opinion). Each of these statutes, save one, permits a = court=20 order to issue in certain cases if visitation is found to be in = the best=20 interests of the child. While it is unnecessary for us to consider = the=20 constitutionality of any particular provision in the case now = before us,=20 it can be noted that the statutes also include a variety of = methods for=20 limiting parents' exposure to third-party visitation petitions and = for=20 ensuring parental decisions are given respect. Many States limit = the=20 identity of permissible petitioners by restricting visitation = petitions to=20 grandparents, or by requiring petitioners to show a substantial=20 relationship with a child, or both. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. = =C2=A738-129=20 (1993 and Supp. 1998) (grandparent visitation authorized under = certain=20 circumstances if a substantial relationship exists); N. C. Gen. = Stat.=20 =C2=A7=C2=A750-13.2, 50-13.2A, 50-13.5 (1999) (same); Iowa Code = =C2=A7598.35 (Supp. 1999)=20 (same; visitation also authorized for great-grandparents); Wis. = Stat.=20 =C2=A7767.245 (Supp. 1999) (visitation authorized under certain = circumstances=20 for "a grandparent, greatgrandparent, stepparent or person who has = maintained a relationship similar to a parent-child relationship = with the=20 child"). The statutes vary in other respects -- for instance, some = permit=20 visitation petitions when there has been a change in circumstances = such as=20 divorce or death of a parent, see, e.g., N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. = =C2=A7458:17-d=20 (1992), and some apply a presumption that parental decisions = should=20 control, see, e.g., Cal. Fam. Code Ann. =C2=A7=C2=A73104(e)-(f) = (West 1994); R. I.=20 Gen. Laws =C2=A715-5-24.3(a)(2)(v) (Supp. 1999). Georgia's is the = sole State=20 Legislature to have adopted a general harm to the child standard, = see Ga.=20 Code Ann. =C2=A719-7-3(c) (1999), and it did so only after the = Georgia Supreme=20 Court held the State's prior visitation statute invalid under the = Federal=20 and Georgia Constitutions, see Brooks v. Parkerson, 265 Ga. 189, = 454 S. E.=20 2d 769, cert. denied, 516 U. S. 942 (1995).
[117]	In light of the inconclusive historical record and case law, as = well=20 as the almost universal adoption of the best interests standard = for=20 visitation disputes, I would be hard pressed to conclude the right = to be=20 free of such review in all cases is itself " `implicit in the = concept of=20 ordered liberty.' " Glucksberg, 521 U. S., at 721 (quoting Palko = v.=20 Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319, 325 (1937)). In my view, it would be = more=20 appropriate to conclude that the constitutionality of the = application of=20 the best interests standard depends on more specific factors. In = short, a=20 fit parent's right vis-=C3=A0-vis a complete stranger is one = thing; her right=20 vis-=C3=A0-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another. = The=20 protection the Constitution requires, then, must be elaborated = with care,=20 using the discipline and instruction of the case law system. We = must keep=20 in mind that family courts in the 50 States confront these factual = variations each day, and are best situated to consider the = unpredictable,=20 yet inevitable, issues that arise. Cf. Ankenbrandt v. Richards, = 504 U. S.=20 689, 703-704 (1992).
[118]	It must be recognized, of course, that a domestic relations = proceeding=20 in and of itself can constitute state intervention that is so = disruptive=20 of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of = a=20 custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the = child's=20 welfare becomes implicated. The best interests of the child = standard has=20 at times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to = unpredictable=20 results. See, e.g., American Law Institute, Principles of the Law = of=20 Family Dissolution 2, and n. 2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, Mar. 20, = 1998). If=20 a single parent who is struggling to raise a child is faced with=20 visitation demands from a third party, the attorney's fees alone = might=20 destroy her hopes and plans for the child's future. Our system = must=20 confront more often the reality that litigation can itself be so=20 disruptive that constitutional protection may be required; and I = do not=20 discount the possibility that in some instances the best interests = of the=20 child standard may provide insufficient protection to the = parent-child=20 relationship. We owe it to the Nation's domestic relations legal=20 structure, however, to proceed with caution.
[119]	It should suffice in this case to reverse the holding of the = State=20 Supreme Court that the application of the best interests of the = child=20 standard is always unconstitutional in third-party visitation = cases.=20 Whether, under the circumstances of this case, the order requiring = visitation over the objection of this fit parent violated the = Constitution=20 ought to be reserved for further proceedings. Because of its = sweeping=20 ruling requiring the harm to the child standard, the Supreme Court = of=20 Washington did not have the occasion to address the specific = visitation=20 order the Troxels obtained. More specific guidance should await a = case in=20 which a State's highest court has considered all of the facts in = the=20 course of elaborating the protection afforded to parents by the = laws of=20 the State and by the Constitution itself. Furthermore, in my view, = we need=20 not address whether, under the correct constitutional standards, = the=20 Washington statute can be invalidated on its face. This question, = too,=20 ought to be addressed by the state court in the first=20 instance.
[120]	In my view the judgment under review should be vacated and the = case=20 remanded for further proceedings.

	Opinion Footnotes

[121]	*fn1 All 50 States have statutes that provide for = grandparent visitation in some form. See Ala. Code =C2=A730-3-4.1 = (1989);=20 Alaska Stat. Ann. =C2=A725.20.065 (1998); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. = =C2=A725-409 (1994);=20 Ark. Code Ann. =C2=A79-13-103 (1998); Cal. Fam. Code Ann. = =C2=A73104 (West 1994);=20 Colo. Rev. Stat. =C2=A719-1-117 (1999); Conn. Gen. Stat. = =C2=A746b-59 (1995); Del.=20 Code Ann., Tit. 10, =C2=A71031(7) (1999); Fla. Stat. =C2=A7752.01 = (1997); Ga. Code=20 Ann. =C2=A719-7-3 (1991); Haw. Rev. Stat. =C2=A7571-46.3 (1999); = Idaho Code =C2=A732-719=20 (1999); Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 750, =C2=A75/607 (1998); Ind. Code = =C2=A731-17-5-1=20 (1999); Iowa Code =C2=A7598.35 (1999); Kan. Stat. Ann. = =C2=A738-129 (1993); Ky. Rev.=20 Stat. Ann. =C2=A7405.021 (Baldwin 1990); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. = =C2=A79:344 (West Supp.=20 2000); La. Civ. Code Ann., Art. 136 (West Supp. 2000); Me. Rev. = Stat.=20 Ann., Tit. 19A, =C2=A71803 (1998); Md. Fam. Law Code Ann. = =C2=A79-102 (1999); Mass.=20 Gen. Laws =C2=A7119:39D (1996); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. = =C2=A7722.27b (Supp. 1999);=20 Minn. Stat. =C2=A7257.022 (1998); Miss. Code Ann. =C2=A793-16-3 = (1994); Mo. Rev.=20 Stat. =C2=A7452.402 (Supp. 1999); Mont. Code Ann. =C2=A740-9-102 = (1997); Neb. Rev.=20 Stat. =C2=A743-1802 (1998); Nev. Rev. Stat. =C2=A7125C.050 (Supp. = 1999); N. H. Rev.=20 Stat. Ann. =C2=A7458:17-d (1992); N. J. Stat. Ann. =C2=A79:2-7.1 = (West Supp.=20 1999-2000); N. M. Stat. Ann. =C2=A740-9-2 (1999); N. Y. Dom. Rel. = Law =C2=A772=20 (McKinney 1999); N. C. Gen. Stat. =C2=A7=C2=A750-13.2, 50-13.2A = (1999); N. D. Cent.=20 Code =C2=A714-09-05.1 (1997); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. = =C2=A7=C2=A73109.051, 3109.11 (Supp.=20 1999); Okla. Stat., Tit. 10, =C2=A75 (Supp. 1999); Ore. Rev. Stat. = =C2=A7109.121=20 (1997); 23 Pa. Cons. Stat. =C2=A7=C2=A75311-5313 (1991); R. I. = Gen. Laws =C2=A7=C2=A715-5-24=20 to 15-5-24.3 (Supp. 1999); S. C. Code Ann. =C2=A720-7-420(33) = (Supp. 1999); S.=20 D. Codified Laws =C2=A725-4-52 (1999); Tenn. Code Ann. = =C2=A7=C2=A736-6-306, 36-6-307=20 (Supp. 1999); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. =C2=A7153.433 (Supp. 2000); Utah = Code Ann.=20 =C2=A730-5-2 (1998); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 15, = =C2=A7=C2=A71011-1013 (1989); Va. Code Ann.=20 =C2=A720-124.2 (1995); W. Va. Code =C2=A7=C2=A748-2B-1 to 48-2B-7 = (1999); Wis. Stat.=20 =C2=A7=C2=A7767.245, 880.155 (1993-1994); Wyo. Stat. Ann. = =C2=A720-7-101=20 (1999).
[122]	*fn2 The Supreme Court of Washington made its = ruling in an=20 action where three separate cases, including the Troxels', had = been=20 consolidated. In re Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 6-7, 969 P. 2d 21, = 23-24=20 (1998). The court also addressed two statutes, Wash. Rev. Code=20 =C2=A726.10.160(3) (Supp. 1996) and former Wash. Rev. Code = =C2=A726.09.240 (1994),=20 137 Wash. 2d, at 7, 969 P. 2d, at 24, the latter of which is not = even at=20 issue in this case. See Brief for Petitioners 6, n. 9; see also = ante, at=20 2. Its constitutional analysis discussed only the statutory = language and=20 neither mentioned the facts of any of the three cases nor reviewed = the=20 records of their trial court proceedings below. 137 Wash. 2d, at = 13-21,=20 969 P. 2d, at 27-31. The decision invalidated both statutes = without=20 addressing their application to particular facts: "We conclude = petitioners=20 have standing but, as written, the statutes violate the parents'=20 constitutionally protected interests. These statutes allow any = person, at=20 any time, to petition for visitation without regard to = relationship to the=20 child, without regard to changed circumstances, and without regard = to=20 harm." Id., at 5, 969 P. 2d, at 23 (emphasis added); see also id., = at 21,=20 969 P. 2d, at 31 ("RCW 26.10.160(3) and former RCW 26.09.240 = impermissibly=20 interfere with a parent's fundamental interest in the care, = custody and=20 companionship of the = child"
[123]	*fn3 As Justice O'Connor points out, the = best-interests=20 provision "contains no requirement that a court accord the = parent's=20 decision any presumption of validity or any weight whatsoever. = Instead,=20 the Washington statute places the best-interest determination = solely in=20 the hands of the judge." Ante, at = 8.
[124]	*fn4 Cf. Chicago v. Morales, 527 U. S. 41, 71 = (1999)=20 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) ("The=20 ordinance is unconstitutional, not because a policeman applied = this=20 discretion wisely or poorly in a particular case, but rather = because the=20 policeman enjoys too much discretion in every case. And if every=20 application of the ordinance represents an exercise of unlimited=20 discretion, then the ordinance is invalid in all its=20 applications").
[125]	*fn5 The Supreme Court of Washington invalidated = the=20 broadly sweeping statute at issue on similarly limited reasoning: = "Some=20 parents and judges will not care if their child is physically = disciplined=20 by a third person; some parents and judges will not care if a = third person=20 teaches the child a religion inconsistent with the parents' = religion; and=20 some judges and parents will not care if the child is exposed to = or taught=20 racist or sexist beliefs. But many parents and judges will care, = and,=20 between the two, the parents should be the ones to choose whether = to=20 expose their children to certain people or ideas." 137 Wash. 2d, = at 21,=20 969 P. 2d, at 31 (citation = omitted).
[126]	*fn6 This is the pivot between Justice Kennedy's = approach=20 and mine.
[127]	*fn7 This case also does not involve a challenge = based upon=20 the Privileges and Immunities Clause and thus does not present an=20 opportunity to reevaluate the meaning of that Clause. See Saenz v. = Roe,=20 526 U. S. 489, 527-528 (1999) (Thomas, J., = dissenting).
[128]	*fn8 The State Supreme Court held that, "as = written, the=20 statutes violate the parents' constitutionally protected = interests." In re=20 Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 5, 969 P. 2d 21, 23 = (1998).
[129]	*fn9 As the dissenting judge on the state appeals = court=20 noted, "[t]he trial court here was not presented with any guidance = as to=20 the proper test to be applied in a case such as this." In re = Troxel, 87=20 Wash. App. 131, 143, 940 P. 2d 698, 703 (1997) (opinion of = Ellington, J.).=20 While disagreeing with the appeals court majority's conclusion = that the=20 state statute was constitutionally infirm, Judge Ellington = recognized that=20 despite this disagreement, the appropriate result would not be = simply to=20 affirm. Rather, because there had been no definitive guidance as = to the=20 proper construction of the statute, "[t]he findings necessary to = order=20 visitation over the objections of a parent are thus not in the = record, and=20 I would remand for further proceedings." = Ibid.
[130]	*fn10 Unlike Justice O'Connor, ante, at 10-11, I = find no=20 suggestion in the trial court's decision in this case that the = court was=20 applying any presumptions at all in its analysis, much less one in = favor=20 of the grandparents. The first excerpt Justice O'Connor quotes = from the=20 trial court's ruling, ante, at 10, says nothing one way or another = about=20 who bears the burden under the statute of demonstrating "best = interests."=20 There is certainly no indication of a presumption against the = parents'=20 judgment, only a " `commonsensical' " estimation that, usually but = not=20 always, visiting with grandparents can be good for children. Ibid. = The=20 second quotation, ante, at 11, " `I think [visitation] would be in = the=20 best interest of the children and I haven't been shown that it is = not in=20 [the] best interest of the children,' " sounds as though the judge = has=20 simply concluded, based on the evidence before him, that = visitation in=20 this case would be in the best interests of both girls. Verbatim = Report of=20 Proceedings in In re Troxel, No. 93-3-00650-7 (Wash. Super. Ct., = Dec. 14,=20 1994), p. 214. These statements do not provide us with a = definitive=20 assessment of the law the court applied regarding a "presumption" = either=20 way. Indeed, a different impression is conveyed by the judge's = very next=20 comment: "That has to be balanced, of course, with Mr. and Mrs. = Wynn=20 [a.k.a. Tommie Granville], who are trying to put together a family = that=20 includes eight children, ... trying to get all those children = together at=20 the same time and put together some sort of functional unit = wherein the=20 children can be raised as brothers and sisters and spend lots of = quality=20 time together." Ibid. The judge then went on to reject the = Troxels'=20 efforts to attain the same level of visitation that their son, the = girls'=20 biological father, would have had, had he been alive. "[T]he fact = that Mr.=20 Troxel is deceased and he was the natural parent and as much as = the=20 grandparents would maybe like to step into the shoes of Brad, = under our=20 law that is not what we can do. The grandparents cannot step into = the=20 shoes of a deceased parent, per say [sic], as far as whole gamut = of=20 visitation rights are concerned." Id., at 215. Rather, as the = judge put=20 it, "I understand your desire to do that as loving grandparents.=20 Unfortunately that would impact too dramatically on the children = and their=20 ability to be integrated into the nuclear unit with the mother." = Id., at=20 222-223. However one understands the trial court's decision -- and = my=20 point is merely to demonstrate that it is surely open to = interpretation --=20 its validity under the state statute as written is a judgment for = the=20 state appellate courts to make in the first = instance.
[131]	*fn11 Justice Souter would conclude from the = state court's=20 statement that the statute "do[es] not require the petitioner to = establish=20 that he or she has a substantial relationship with the child," In = re=20 Smith, 137 Wash. 2d 1, 21, 969 P. 2d 21, 31 (1998), that the state = court=20 has "authoritatively read [the `best interests'] provision as = placing=20 hardly any limit on a court's discretion to award visitation = rights,"=20 ante, at 3 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Apart from the = question=20 whether one can deem this description of the statute an = "authoritative"=20 construction, it seems to me exceedingly unlikely that the state = court=20 held the statute unconstitutional because it believed that the = "best=20 interests" standard imposes "hardly any limit" on courts' = discretion. See=20 n. 5, infra.
[132]	*fn12 The phrase "best interests of the child" = appears in=20 no less than 10 current Washington state statutory provisions = governing=20 determinations from guardianship to termination to custody to = adoption.=20 See, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code =C2=A726.09.240 (6) (Supp. 1996) = (amended version of=20 visitation statute enumerating eight factors courts may consider = in=20 evaluating a child's best interests); =C2=A726.09.002 (in cases of = parental=20 separation or divorce "best interests of the child are served by a = parenting arrangement that best maintains a child's emotional = growth,=20 health and stability, and physical care"; "best interest of the = child is=20 ordinarily served when the existing pattern of interaction between = a=20 parent and child is altered only to the extent necessitated by the = changed=20 relationship of the parents or as required to protect the child = from=20 physical, mental, or emotional harm"); =C2=A726.10.100 ("The court = shall=20 determine custody in accordance with the best interests of the = child").=20 Indeed, the Washington state courts have invoked the standard on = numerous=20 occasions in applying these statutory provisions -- just as if the = phrase=20 had quite specific and apparent meaning. See, e.g., In re McDoyle, = 122=20 Wash. 2d 604, 859 P. 2d 1239 (1993) (upholding trial court "best = interest"=20 assessment in custody dispute); McDaniels v. Carlson, 108 Wash. 2d = 299,=20 310, 738 P. 2d 254, 261 (1987) (elucidating "best interests" = standard in=20 paternity suit context). More broadly, a search of current state = custody=20 and visitation laws reveals fully 698 separate references to the = "best=20 interest of the child" standard, a number that, at a minimum, = should give=20 the Court some pause before it upholds a decision implying that = those=20 words, on their face, may be too boundless to pass muster under = the=20 Federal Constitution.
[133]	*fn13 It necessarily follows that under the far = more=20 stringent demands suggested by the majority in United States v. = Salerno,=20 481 U. S. 739, 745 (1987) (plaintiff seeking facial invalidation = "must=20 establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act = would be=20 valid"), respondent's facial challenge must = fail.
[134]	*fn14 The suggestion by Justice Thomas that this = case may=20 be resolved solely with reference to our decision in Pierce v. = Society of=20 Sisters, 268 U. S. 510, 535 (1925), is unpersuasive. Pierce = involved a=20 parent's choice whether to send a child to public or private = school. While=20 that case is a source of broad language about the scope of = parents' due=20 process rights with respect to their children, the constitutional=20 principles and interests involved in the schooling context do not=20 necessarily have parallel implications in this family law = visitation=20 context, in which multiple overlapping and competing prerogatives = of=20 various plausibly interested parties are at = stake.
[135]	*fn15 This Court has on numerous occasions = acknowledged=20 that children are in many circumstances possessed of = constitutionally=20 protected rights and liberties. See P