Love Is Earned

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF COOK COUNTY, ILLINOIS
COUNTY DEPARTMENT - DOMESTIC RELATIONS DIVISION

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

BRIAN LOVETT, Petitioner,

and

LAURIE LOVETT, Respondent

Case No. 00 D 06725

TRIAL BRIEF

Brian Lovett (hereinafter "Brian") hereby submits his Trial Brief in support of his position and to present the applicable legal principles and argument.

INTRODUCTION

Anything repugnant to the Constitution is null and void.

Chief Justice John Marshall, Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 127 (1803).

"The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it."

Albert Einstein

Brian alleges fraud and irreconcilable differences, and is seeking dissolution of his marriage as a result of these contentions:

Brian will prove that Laurie Lovett (hereinafter "Laurie") committed fraud and breached her contract when she entered into a verbal contract with Brian indicating that she would contribute her salary to the marital expenses, if Brian would reciprocate. Laurie then refused to contribute her salary, and the parties were required to live from Brian's pre-marital assets and salary.

Except for a very small contribution of $4,600, Laurie's income was not shared with Brian during the first fourteen months of the marriage.

Laurie did not consistently begin sharing her paycheck with Brian until twenty-six months after the parties were married, and only after Brian had announced his intent for divorce. Brian was therefore forced to pay a significant portion of the marital expenses. During those first twenty-six months, Laurie unwillingly contributed only 47% of her salary to the marriage, while Brian was effectively forced to contribute his full 100%. Laurie refused to tell Brian where the remaining $X was, which drove significant tension in the marriage.

To his detriment, Brian relied on this verbal contract with Laurie, and suffered substantial harm as a result.

Laurie funneled money to her New Jersey family without Brian's knowledge. After Brian discovered Laurie's dishonest behavior, Laurie promised Brian that her family would return this money. Brian is informed and believes the money has not been returned. Laurie has admitted these allegations are true.

Brian is informed and believes that Laurie broke her life commitment to the marriage and family when she did not put the marriage and family as primary in her priorities; instead, Brian contends Laurie's prime concern and loyalty was to her family in New Jersey.

More serious than Laurie's admitted physical abuse of Brian, Laurie has openly tried to alienate Samantha Lovett (hereinafter "Samantha") from Brian. Brian is seeking that this Court provides an impassioned disapproval of Laurie's efforts to thwart Brian's strong relationship with his daughter, and prohibit future abuse by Laurie.

Additionally, Brian will present indisputable proof that Laurie's attorneys have willfully committed perjury and fraud, and have assisted Laurie in committing perjury and fraud.

Furthermore, Brian is seeking that statutes 750 ILCS 5/602, 603, 604, 607, 609, 610, 506, 501 (a), 503 (g), 505, 507, 510 (a), 510 (e), 510 (f), 513, 504, 501 (c)(1), 503 (j), and 508 (as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "best interest of the child", "child support," or "maintenance," and any other section within 750 ILCS 5 that refers to "attorneys' fees"), as well as parts 13.3.1 and 13.3.2 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 201 through 214, be declared unconstitutional as they violate his fundamental Rights (e.g., to his children, to his property, to his privacy, to his personal liberty, to equality, to due process).[1] Such "laws," which are opened to varied interpretation, are, in reality, not laws at all but were born dead.

Brian requests that this Court issue formal findings of fact and conclusions of law if it rules unfavorably on ANY of Brian's relief sought. Specifically, this Court MUST show WHY the numerous U.S. Supreme Court decisions, which override ALL State decisions when there is a conflict, are not applicable or irrelevant.[2]

This Court has no authority to "award" Brian anything less than equal parenting time and responsibilities as Brian is a fit parent, and no evidence or claim exists otherwise. A parenting plan has existed for over fifteen months whereby Brian and Laurie share time and responsibilities with Samantha equally. Samantha has not had any signs of adjustment problems, and, in fact, is thriving. It is in Samantha's best interest to be with both parents equally, and for both parents to jointly share in major decision-making for her.

This Court has no authority to award Laurie "child support" from Brian, as no evidence exists that Brian does not reasonably support his daughter. Brian is seeking that no award of child support is ordered, and that each parent provide for Samantha when she is in his or her care. Brian is further seeking that only major expenses which the parties jointly agree to (i.e., education and major health care) are split equally between Brian and Laurie.

This Court has no authority to award Laurie maintenance or attorneys' fees from Brian, as Laurie makes a high annual salary, has significant assets, is readily employable, is financially able to meet her contractual commitments, and was not economically injured as a result of the marriage. The standard of living established in the marriage was almost exclusively based on Brian's salary and pre-marital assets, which allowed Laurie to frivolously waste her own assets and fraudulently filter them to her New Jersey family. Brian and Laurie entered an agreed order clearly identifying that future income and expenditures would be deemed equivalent in value, thereby precluding any ability by this Court to award maintenance or attorneys' fees based on Laurie not being able to support herself or fulfill her personal financial obligations (i.e., by definition of the word equivalent, Brian then would also not be able to support himself or fulfill his personal financial obligations). Additionally, Brian owes no duty to Laurie after they are divorced. Brian is seeking that no awards of maintenance or attorneys' fees are ordered.

Constitutional Challenges

Before Brian filed for divorce, his "constitutional rights" were intact.[3] However, during these proceedings, the previous court (Judge Veronica Mathein, hereinafter "Previous Court") had, on MANY occasions, temporarily suspended and/or eliminated Brian's Rights for no other reason than because it has the purported statutory authority (i.e., absolute power) to do so. The Previous Court has WILLFULLY revoked and shredded Brian's Rights without ANY cause, and thus insulted the Federal Constitution and committed perjury against its oath of office. As a result, Brian has suffered tremendously. But, as John Adams said: "I am well aware of the toil and blood and treasure that it will cost to maintain this Declaration, and support and defend these States. Yet through all the gloom I can see the rays of ravishing light and glory. I can see that the end is worth more than all the means...." Brian intends to get his Rights back.

It is BEYOND preposterous that Brian, an Illinois citizen, should have to take a defensive posture in this case to defend and protect his Rights to his child and his property in this Court, when he has not been convicted of a crime. Yet, this is exactly the condition of our legal system, and representatively the Previous Court. That court, like all "family" courts around the country, has nullified the Federal Constitution. Along with a small, highly dedicated group of individuals around the country, Brian's resolve in bringing the Federal Constitution back to "family" court and ensuring that Justice is served is without precedence. He intends to prove it. As Edmund Burke once said: "The only thing needed for evil to prosper is for good men to do nothing."

Make no mistake about it: if this Court refuses to declare all of the referenced statutes and rules repulsive to the Federal Constitution, and therefore unconstitutional based on the irrefutable, voluminous, and CRYSTAL CLEAR U.S. Supreme Court decisions presented here, there will be no question that this Court clearly ignored and warred against the Constitution, as it thus found federal law and decisions irrelevant and inapplicable.

The ONLY relevant issue in a divorce proceeding with fit parents is the separation of MARITAL assets. The parties' individual, FUNDAMENTAL Rights (e.g., to children, to property, to privacy, to personal liberty, to equality) continue to exist as they have. Fundamental Rights are Rights that cannot be impinged on IN ANY WAY or taken away from any state citizen UNLESS they have been convicted of a CRIMINAL crime. Fundamental Rights are NOT privileges (i.e., temporary authority granted to citizens by a "higher power"). A fundamental Right is the sovereign authority to do something without permission from a higher power, because that person IS the higher power. The State/judiciary does not have ANY jurisdiction or authority to usurp fundamental Rights without criminal conviction. Any attempt by the State/judiciary to do otherwise is a flawed and obvious attempt to "rule" rather than to "serve," and is therefore unconstitutional. As a reminder of Thomas Jefferson's words: "A free people [claim] their rights as derived from the laws of nature, and not as the gift of their chief magistrate."

As such, Brian challenges the constitutionality of all Illinois statutes that refer to the "best interest of the child" (e.g., 750 ILCS 5/602, 603, 604, 607, 609, 610, 503 (g), and 506, as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "best interest of the child") (hereinafter "Best Interest of the Child Statutes"), on their face and as applied, which compel the State's judiciary to make awards of child custody and parenting time, or allocation of parental responsibilities, privileges, and parenting time, or assignment of "guardians" and "evaluators," within the context of dissolution of marriage actions and post-decree of dissolution of marriage actions concerning children. Brian contends that the challenged statutes and rules violate well-recognized FUNDAMENTAL Rights, including the Right to due process of law, the Right to equal protection of the law, and the Right to the care, custody, control, companionship, and nurture of one's offspring embodied in the fundamental liberty interest in family, which Rights are secured by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution. Brian is seeking that the challenged "best interest" statutes and rules are declared unconstitutional. It would be difficult to find a statute that fails more comprehensively to achieve its stated goal than the purported "best interest of the child" statute.

Additionally, the so-called "child support" statutes (750 ILCS 5/505, and associated sections 501 (a), 507, 510 (a), 510 (e), 510 (f), and 513, as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "child support") (hereinafter "Child Support Statutes"), the maintenance statutes (750 ILCS 5/504, and associated sections 501 (a), 507, and 510 (a), as well as any other sections and rules that refer to "maintenance") (hereinafter "Maintenance Statutes"), and the attorneys' fee statutes (750 ILCS 5/501 (c)(1), 503 (j), and 508, as well as any other sections within 750 ILCS 5 and rules that refer to "attorneys' fees") (hereinafter "Attorneys' Fees Statutes"), as well as parts 13.3.1 and 13.3.2 of the Rules of the Circuit Court of Cook County (hereinafter "Mandatory Disclosure Rules") and Illinois Supreme Court Rules 201 through 214 (hereinafter "Discovery Rules"), are directly and egregiously violative of the Federal Constitution and Illinois Constitution. Specifically, Brian contends that the statutes and rules are unconstitutional on their face[4] and as applied because they violate the FUNDAMENTAL Rights to equal protection, to due process, to privacy, to property, and to proscriptions about involuntary servitude, all of which are guaranteed to Brian under the Federal Constitution. Further, the statutes are unconstitutional as threatened to be applied to Brian because they violate the Rights to not be imprisoned for debt and for proscriptions about private takings for private use or public use, all guaranteed to Brian under the Illinois Constitution. Brian is seeking that all of these challenged statutes and rules are declared unconstitutional. In the words of Thomas Jefferson: "The policy of the American government is to leave their citizens free, neither restraining nor aiding them in their pursuits." Or, at least that is the way it is supposed to be.

CHILD SUPPORT: In the instant matter, and for that matter, in the vast majority of cases, each parent stands in the same relation to the child as they did before the divorce. They each owe the child a duty of support, the threshold of which is reasonable support - food, clothing, shelter, safety. The State cannot dictate how much money or other assets must be expended for the benefit of children in married families, except to the extent that a threshold of reasonableness is achieved. The State cannot treat parents in non-intact families differently from intact families. The only time the State can act in either family is if they have passed below the threshold of reasonableness. Additionally, the child support factors have no economic basis and are not rationally related to their initial/intended purpose.

MAINTENANCE: The State cannot treat spouses or ex-spouses differently, regardless of their income levels or asset base. The only constitutionally legal statement a judge can make about spouses regarding income or assets is "Who cares?" The State lacks a legitimate or compelling interest in re-allocating future earnings of one spouse or non-related person to another. Evidence of legislative intent is no longer applicable nor applies in the award of maintenance. Alimony was designed for the wife of a broken marriage who needed financial assistance, and to compensate women for past discrimination during marriage which left them unprepared to fend for themselves in the working world following divorce. The underlying facts of maintenance/alimony no longer exist, in that sex is no longer a factor (i.e., women are no longer the only recipients of alimony) and women now more fully participate in the workplace. Further, reverse discrimination has occurred as a result of women overwhelmingly being "awarded" custody. Additionally, the maintenance factors have no economic basis and are not rationally related to their initial/intended purpose.

ATTORNEYS' FEES: The State cannot treat spouses or ex-spouses differently, or discriminate against financially able individuals, regardless of their income levels, asset base, or financial ability. The State lacks a legitimate or compelling interest in awarding attorneys' fees from one spouse or non-related person to another when there is no showing of fault, tort, compensable injury, or damages.

MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AND DISCOVERY: The State cannot "mandate" that a spouse or ex-spouse be required to turn over any financial papers on the basis of divorce, as the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution specifically prohibits such a violation without probable cause of something ILLEGAL, supported by oath or affirmation. Additionally, the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution declares that a person cannot be compelled to be witness and give information about himself, regardless of whether or not such information is incriminating. This applies to both criminal and civil suits. A "Mandatory Disclosure," and the Discovery Rules as applied, are nothing more than a compulsory production of a private party's books and papers, to be used against him to extort his property. Effectively, Mandatory Disclosure and Discovery is an unauthorized "fishing expedition," as a divorce action does not alone give the government probable cause of illegal activities.

Substantive due process requires, in essence, that the outcome of judicial proceedings be fundamentally fair. From the outset of our constitutional history, due process of law as it occurs in the Fifth Amendment and now Fourteenth Amendment has been recognized as a restraint upon government where fundamental interests are at stake.

This, then, is the gravamen of these contentions: Who shall control Brian's money and the quality and nature of his relationship with his offspring - the State or the individual? The State and this Court can attempt to assert that the State shall have pre-eminence in this arena and may supersede the decisions of the individual. Our Founding Fathers, of course, thought otherwise. As Thomas Jefferson said: "To take from one because it is thought that his own industry and that of his father's has acquired too much, in order to spare to others, who, or whose fathers have not exercised equal industry and skill, is to violate arbitrarily the first principle of association - the guarantee to every one of a free exercise of his industry and the fruits acquired by it."

The Previous Court has told Brian openly and on record that Brian's "constitutional rights are subject to the law, and more specifically to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act." By this statement, that court obviously feels that it is functioning appropriately under the State law when it interferes with Brian's FUNDAMENTAL Rights. Brian offers three reminders of history to that court: 1) Spanish inquisitors used to argue that burning people at the stake saved their souls and was thus in their "best interest;" 2) In America, slavery was entirely "legal," as was the racial segregation that followed it; and 3) the Nazi high officers in Germany during World War II also believed they were functioning appropriately and maintaining order the entire time they affected the Terminal Solution and created untold human misery and pain.[5] The Nazi's used to boast: "Tell a big enough lie often enough and people will believe it's true." In other words, the notion that society's "laws" are always moral is ridiculous and IMMORAL.

In light of the Previous Court's statement, Brian suggests for that court to re-read the Supremacy Clause of the Federal Constitution. Under the Supremacy Clause, everyone must follow federal law in the face of conflicting state law. The government of the United States has declared, through the U.S. Supreme Court, that a parent's Right to the custody, care, control, companionship, and nurture of his or her child is a fundamental Right, recognized by that Court as an element of the liberty interest in family. For state intrusion into familial relationships to be allowed, the state must meet a burden of compelling interest. Participation of a parent in his or her own divorce litigation, or the completion of said divorce, does not meet that burden. It is as simple as that.

It is embarrassing that this reminder needs to be made by Brian (who has no legal training) to court officers (who are supposed to have legal training), but before a state can deprive a person of life, liberty, or property, it must insure that all of the Rights of the individual established under the Constitution have been protected. Most individuals would gladly surrender their lives, liberty, or property before they would surrender their children. The Right to raise one's children is at least as fundamental as the Right to any other liberty interest, and is entitled to at least as great a level of protection from governmental interference.

Brian's plea for this Court's understanding and care should be obvious. Constitutionally, ethically, developmentally, and psychologically, children need as much time, love, support, and nurturing as humanly possible from both parents. If this Court, by force of a gun, allows Samantha's mother to hurt Samantha by depriving her, an innocent child, of her father, the destruction will be irreparable. This Court must not allow Samantha's mother to hurt her like that. With every means available, this Court must fight for and protect an innocent child's life, just as her father is doing already. This Court must fight to help educate Samantha's mother about the harm her actions and behaviors will do to Samantha. Anything less by this Court is not only unconstitutional - it is morally wrong and should be considered State- and judiciary- sponsored child abuse. Regardless of the overwhelming data and evidence available that demonstrates children are significantly worse off without their fathers (which was too voluminous to mention it all here), the mere fact that Samantha's mother wants to take Samantha away from her loving and fit father should be all of the evidence this Court needs to know that Laurie does not have Samantha's best interest in mind or at heart. Brian is a dedicated, caring, nurturing, loving, full-time father whose daughter loves him, and his fight for his Right to be equally involved in his daughter's life should be the only proof this Court needs. Bestowed upon it by flagrant legislative errors and malice, this Court must not underestimate the mental abuse and damage it has the capability and power to deliver on an innocent, little child. You have the power - use it wisely. As Thomas Jefferson said: "The legitimate powers of government extend to such acts only as are injurious to others."

Additionally, Brian fully understands the magnitude of what he is asking this Court to do. Brian is asking this Court to restore constitutional legitimacy to the dissolution of marriage. The wide applicability of declaring these statutes and rules unconstitutional will create problems of considerable complexity, especially economic ones, across the entire country. The decision will even have widespread impact around the world. In our country's early history, we said that the economics of freeing the slaves made it impossible. It could not be done, even if it was morally right. In the early 1950's, racial segregation in public schools was the norm across America, with laws making it so. We also had segregation in other public areas, such as restaurants and restrooms. Many tried to prevent righting that flawed morality as well. The U.S. Supreme Court has said these past atrocious state laws, which were "on the books" for decades, were wrong. If this Court refuses to correct the State's moral and legal errors now when they are so clearly presented here, the U.S. Supreme Court will do so.[6] The cost of the judicial carnage created and permitted by the challenged statutes and rules, in terms of human lives, human misery, human dignity, human Rights, and the health and welfare of the State's children, is immeasurable, perhaps even exceeds the butchery of racial segregation, and is more than reason enough for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene to enjoin the enforcement of the most deceitful, insidious, and downright evil laws ever created by man.

Brian of course understands that the U.S. Supreme Court is very selective in the cases it reviews. However, there is no remedy within any state court system for these wholesale violations of protected fundamental Rights. The state "family" courts routinely ignore pleas for protection or restoration of basic liberties. The state appellate courts routinely uphold custody decisions by "family" law judges by stating that they "will not second guess the finder of fact" or by dismissing the appeal at the earliest opportunity - when, in fact, the issues before them indicate profound constitutional violations. And the state supreme courts exercise their discretion in matters related to constitutional protections in domestic relations disputes by declining to hear such cases. It should also go without saying that this case presents questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular facts and parties involved. If you knew that millions of children across America were being abducted, and you could specifically point to the perpetrators by name, and you had indisputable evidence that the state government was sponsoring and encouraging it, would not that be of significant national importance? Not since Brown v. Board of Education has there been such a nationally important issue. When a large, artificially created class of citizens are denied fundamental Rights by operation of clearly unconstitutional laws, and when a state judiciary's application of those laws thwarts, and not infrequently destroys, the most precious of human relationships, it is proper for the U.S. Supreme Court to intervene. Brian will not let this Court fake reality, and begs this Court to be courageous now, rather than responsible and accountable later. It is black or white - there will be no gray.

As Thomas Jefferson said: "Experience has shown that, even under the best forms of government, those entrusted with power have, in time and by slow operations, perverted it into tyranny." There are only two things that stand between tyranny and liberty: the Federal Constitution and our will. Despotism only occurs when we allow it. Contrary to popular belief, we are NOT a democracy in that the majority cannot limit the inalienable Rights of the minority - we are a constitutional republic. Our Rights to life, liberty, and property cannot be denied. The State is not sovereign, contrary to what it believes - the individual is. The reminder should be unnecessary, but the government works for Brian and exists for his purposes; Brian does not exist for the purposes of government. Brian has a Right to demand that this Court correct the infringements of his liberties, and this Court's primary duty is to do so. The judiciary may not neglect its duties to the Federal Constitution. Fidelity to the Constitution requires this Court to protect Brian and Samantha's inalienable Rights.

Additionally, the matter of judicial immunity obviously is not absolute. Case "law" provides ample examples of when a judge loses judicial immunity, such as acting without jurisdiction or violating clear and settled law. Also, each court takes an oath to support the Federal Constitution, and should the court abandon that fiduciary duty, they are exposed as a proper person. This Court is required to know and understand basic constitutional law, especially the meaning of FUNDAMENTAL Rights, and to know and take protective action when fundamental Rights are implicated as they are so obviously implicated here. The Right to your children, the Right to your property, the Right to your privacy, and the Right to equality are but a few examples of fundamental Rights implicated by these statutes and rules. Should this Court order any decision contrary to Brian's relief sought and exile him by denying his Right to his child, or denying his Right to property, or denying his Right to personal liberty, or in any way deem him less than equal, it would not only be considered extortion but also Court-sanctioned child abuse, and will be a clear and flagrant abuse of power under Title 42 USC 1983. Only two elements are necessary for recovery under Title 42 USC 1983: (1) whether conduct complained of was committed by personal action under color of state law, and (2) whether this conduct deprived the person of Rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Federal Constitution. The Previous Court has indeed committed intolerable personal acts under the color of State law and has indeed deprived Brian of Rights, privileges, and immunities secured by the Federal Constitution. That court did not have the authority to deny Brian, a fit parent without criminal conviction, of fundamental Rights. Brian now offers this Court the opportunity to make amends. Please do not destroy the heart, mind, and soul of an innocent child, much less her father, by denying fundamental Rights without criminal conviction.

The entire arena of "family law" has become a domain of constitutional violations and usurpation of civil Rights. Our children statewide are being raped by the court system of their parents, their birthrights, their heritage, and their civil Rights. In addition to these Rights, parents are also being raped by the court system of their children and their property. Most of the divorce "laws" in Illinois, as in most states, are morally destructive, legally flawed, and harmful to children. This Trial Brief presents the indisputable proof, even though it should be morally obvious to any rational person. Regardless of any claims it may make, the government has NO interest or authority in regulating FUNDAMENTAL Rights, and may not restrict FUNDAMENTAL Rights without a criminal conviction. Brian begs this Court to quickly order it so to prevent further destruction and allow us to start rebuilding the freedom that has been lost.

The essence of the Due Process Clause, which could be considered the most important part of the Federal Constitution, is a fair hearing before an impartial judge, since a hearing before a partial and biased judge would be a "hearing" in name only and would make a mockery of the Right. There is no question that the Due Process Clause in the Previous Court is dead. That court has made innumerable "errors" during these divorce proceedings, and Brian recognizes that court as his enemy.[7] Make no mistake about it: Brian is not at war with the mother of his child; Brian is at war with that court and its "officers." This Court is now being offered a chance to correct those "errors." The ineluctable fate of these immoral and illegal statutes and rules is sealed within this case and concurrent, targeted cases around the country. As Samuel Adams once said: "...it does not require a majority to prevail, but rather an irate, tireless minority keen to set brush fires in people's minds..." The Previous Court attempted to temporarily postpone that fate by personally subjecting itself to the guaranteed peril and consequences of Title 42 USC 1983, not to mention high crimes and misdemeanors. Deliberately violating Rights secured by the Federal Constitution, especially when those Rights are explicitly asserted, is not simply malfeasance, but is most assuredly a liability under Title 42 USC 1983, as well as an impeachable offense. After reading through all of the extensive, yet simple evidence presented here, Brian hopes that this Court takes the only opportunity it has to restore credibility to the judicial process. Significant thought, intelligence, and analysis are not required here, as Brian has thoroughly, clearly, and plainly elucidated the "Achilles Heel" of these damaging statutes and rules - the courage and conscientiousness of this Court are the only deciding factors. Either way, Justice will be served.

"There are a thousand hacking at the branches of evil to one who is striking at the root."

Henry David Thoreau

"Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed people can actually change the world; indeed it is the only thing that ever has."

Anthropologist Margaret Mead

GENERAL INFORMATION

1. In re the Marriage of: Brian and Laurie Lovett

a. Date of Marriage: August 31, 1997

b. Date of Separation: April 28, 2000

2. The parties

a. Husband: Brian Lovett

i.  Born X, age 34

ii. Address: 600 W Surf St 4 Chicago IL 60657

iii. Social Security Number: X

iv. Health: Good

v. Attorney: Brian Lovett, Pro Se

1. Address: 600 W Surf St 4 Chicago IL 60657

b. Wife: Laurie Lovett

i.  Born X, age 35

ii. Address: 2034 N Seminary 1 Chicago IL 60614

iii. Social Security Number: X

iv. Health: Good

v. Attorney: Dorene Marcus

1. Davis, Friedman, Zavett, Kane, MacRae, Marcus & Rubens

2. Address: 140 South Dearborn Street, Suite 1600 Chicago, IL 60603

3. Children

a. Samantha Lovett

b. Born X, age 3

4. Grounds

a. Brian alleges irreconcilable differences based on three contentions:

i.  Brian is informed and believes that Laurie committed fraud and breached her contract when she entered into a verbal contract with Brian indicating that she would contribute her salary to the marital expenses, if Brian would reciprocate. Laurie then refused to contribute her salary, and the parties were required to live from Brian's pre-marital assets and salary.

1. Except for a very small contribution of $4,600, Laurie's income was not shared with Brian during the first fourteen months of the marriage.

2. Laurie did not begin formally or consistently sharing her paycheck with Brian until twenty-six months after the parties were married, and only after Brian had announced his intent for divorce. Brian was therefore forced to pay a significant portion of the marital expenses. During those first twenty-six months, Laurie unwillingly contributed only 47% of her wages to the marriage, while Brian was effectively forced to contribute 100%. Laurie refused to tell Brian where the remaining $X was, which drove significant tension in the marriage.

3. To his detriment, Brian relied on this verbal contract with Laurie, and suffered substantial harm as a result.

ii. Laurie funneled money to her New Jersey family without Brian's knowledge. After Brian discovered Laurie's dishonest behavior, Laurie promised Brian that her family would return this money to her. Brian is informed and believes the money has not been returned. Laurie has admitted these allegations are true.

iii. Brian is informed and believes that Laurie broke her life commitment to the marriage and family when she did not put the marriage and family as primary in her priorities; instead, Brian contends Laurie's prime concern and loyalty was to her family in New Jersey.

5. Education

a. Brian Lovett

i.  B.A., University of Illinois (Undergraduate)

ii. M.B.A., University of Chicago (Graduate)

b. Laurie Lovett

i.  B.A., Syracuse University (Undergraduate)

ii. M.M., Stevens Institute of Technology (Graduate)

6. Wages

a. Brian is employed by IBM for a salary of $X annually plus possible bonus.

b. Laurie is employed by Accenture for a salary of $X annually.

7. Summary of disputed items

a. Custody, visitation, removal, child support, maintenance, dissipation, whether property is marital or non-marital, division of marital property, disposition of debts, division of personal property, attorneys' fees

8. Summary of major assets[8]

a. In general, Brian has the following major assets:

Asset	Account Number	Titled	As of	Balance/ Approximate Value
IBM ESOP	X	Brian Lovett	4/15/03	(XXX shares) $X[9]
IBM 401(k)		Brian Lovett	4/15/03	$X
Citibank IRA	X	Brian Lovett	4/15/03	$X
2034 North Seminary	Condominium	Brian and Laurie Lovett[10]	Offer to purchase made on 11/6/02	Listing Price: $X Recent Value: $X[11] Mortgage: $X
Seabury and Smith Insurance Company	X	Insured: Brian Lovett	11/30/02	Death Benefit: $X
Jewelry		Brian Lovett	9/17/97	$X
1998 Acura Sports Utility Vehicle		Brian and Laurie Lovett[12]	1/9/03	$X

b. In general, Laurie has the following major assets:

Asset	Account Number	Titled	As of	Balance/ Approximate Value
Accenture options		Laurie Lovett	1/27/03	$X
Accenture 401(k)		Laurie Lovett	1/24/03	$X
Vanguard IRA	X	Laurie Lovett	12/31/02	$X
Accenture stock	X	Laurie Lovett	1/31/03	$X
2001 BMW		Laurie Lovett	4/24/03	$X

9. Laurie's credibility is effectively non-existent, considering she has shown a clear pattern of constant dishonesty, fraud, perjury (with the help and assistance of her attorney in many cases - see paragraph 13), willful and intentional breach of her contracts, and avoided complying with the terms of the parties' agreements (e.g., see paragraphs 88, 107, 111, 111.b.ii, 118, 140, 141, 143, 145, 147.c.iv, 148, 155, and see also many examples throughout Exhibit B - such as paragraphs 7.b, 12.a, 13.b.vi, and 14.a). The overwhelming evidence presents, and should leave no question of, Laurie's culpability.

10. Upon further study and research, Brian has discovered that the unequal allocation of parental Rights and responsibilities, the imposition of unequal burdens on spouses, the transfer of property from one party to another without a showing of harm, the requirements to divulge private information and papers without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and the consequential material infringement of Brian's fundamental Rights, are impermissible under the strict standards of protection afforded litigants when such fundamental Rights are at stake.

I. JUDICIAL NOTICE

11. All officers of this Court are hereby placed on notice that non-attorney litigants are held to less stringent standards than bar licensed attorneys, and may not be "punished" (e.g., made to pay another party's attorneys' fees) for exercising fundamental Rights. Fundamental Rights do not hang by a tenuous thread of a layman's knowledge of the niceties of law. It is sufficient if it appears that he is attempting to assert his Rights, protected by the Federal Constitution. The plea, rather than the form in which it is asserted, is the substance of which this Court must respect and address.

[13] ...under the allegations of the pro se complaint, which we hold to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers...

Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1972).

And,

[21] To punish a person because he has done what the law plainly allows him to do is a due process violation "of the most basic sort." Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363. In a series of cases beginning with North Carolina v. Pearce and culminating in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the Court has recognized this basic -- and itself uncontroversial -- principle. For while an individual certainly may be penalized for violating the law, he just as certainly may not be punished for exercising a protected statutory or constitutional right.*fn4

[74] *fn4 "[For] an agent of the State to pursue a course of action whose objective is to penalize a person's reliance on his legal rights is 'patently unconstitutional.'" Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (quoting Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 32-33, n. 20).

United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 102 S. Ct. 2485, 73 L. Ed. 2d 74, 50 U.S.L.W. 4696 (1982).

12. Additionally, all litigants have a constitutionally-secured Right to have their claims adjudicated according to the rule of precedent and, by the Supremacy Clause,[13] the Federal Constitution and U.S. Supreme Court decisions take precedence over State court decisions.

[16] Inherent in every judicial decision is a declaration and interpretation of a general principle or rule of law. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177-78 (1803). This declaration of law is authoritative to the extent necessary for the decision, and must be applied in subsequent cases to similarly situated parties. James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 544 (1991); Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 399 (1821). These principles, which form the doctrine of precedent, were well established and well regarded at the time this nation was founded. The Framers of the Constitution considered these principles to derive from the nature of judicial power, and intended that they would limit the judicial power delegated to the courts by Article III of the Constitution. *fn3

[FN 3] "The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." U.S. Const. art. III, ß 1, cl. 1.

[25] ...but the principles of the decision are held, as precedents and authority, to bind future cases of the same nature. This is the constant practice under our whole system of jurisprudence. Our ancestors brought it with them, when they first emigrated to this country; and it is, and always has been considered, as the great security of our rights, our liberties, and our property. It is on this account, that our law is justly deemed certain, and founded in permanent principles, and not dependent upon the caprice or will of judges. A more alarming doctrine could not be promulgated by any American court, than that it was at liberty to disregard all former rules and decisions, and to decide for itself, without reference to the settled course of antecedent principles.

[26] This known course of proceeding, this settled habit of thinking, this conclusive effect of judicial adjudications, was in the full view of the framers of the constitution. It was required, and enforced in every state in the Union; and a departure from it would have been justly deemed an approach to tyranny and arbitrary power, to the exercise of mere discretion, and to the abandonment of all the just checks upon judicial authority. [Emphasis added].

Anastasoff v. United States, No. 99-3917EM (8th Cir. 08/22/2000).

13. As is evidenced by the statements of facts provided in paragraphs 35, 88, 111, and 155, Laurie's attorneys, who are officers of the Court, knew, or should have known, that some of the statements made and pleadings submitted under penalties of perjury by their client conflicted with other statements made and pleadings submitted under penalties of perjury, and also conflicted with statements made by Laurie's attorneys in open court. Further, Laurie's attorneys failed to withdraw pleadings made that they knew contained false and prejudicial statements after being informed of such statements in open court. Also, Laurie's attorneys clearly violated a Court order by failing to disclose materials as ordered, and then attempting to cover-up their fraudulent actions by alteration. Additionally, a reasonable person would find it hard to believe that Laurie's attorneys did not know that the statements they made in open court and through pleadings were not perjured. Finally, Laurie's attorneys advised their client to ignore a proper Notice to Appear and obstructed Brian's access to information and evidence. These facts would appear to show a pattern of willful disregard for the rule of law by Laurie's counsel.

[24] Furthermore, tampering with the administration of justice in the manner indisputably shown here involves far more than an injury to a single litigant. It is a wrong against the institutions set up to protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be tolerated consistently with the good order of society. Surely it cannot be that preservation of the integrity of the judicial process must always wait upon the diligence of litigants. The public welfare demands that the agencies of public justice be not so impotent that they must always be mute and helpless victims of deception and fraud.

[25] Truth needs no disguise.

[37] No fraud is more odious than an attempt to subvert the administration of justice.

Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 64 S. Ct. 997, 88 L. Ed. 1250 (1944).

a. The acts of Laurie's attorneys constitute deliberate, malicious, and severe fraud. These acts have harmed the integrity of the judicial process. Additionally, Laurie's attorneys have offended multiple Illinois Supreme Court Rules, specifically Article VIII, Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct (hereafter "RPC"), Rule 3.3 (Conduct Before a Tribunal) including:

(a) In appearing in a professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:

(1) make a statement of material fact or law to a tribunal which the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is false;

(2) fail to disclose to a tribunal a material fact known to the lawyer when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client;

(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures;

(5) participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer knows or reasonably should know the evidence is false;

(6) counsel or assist the client in conduct the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent;

(7) engage in other illegal conduct or conduct in violation of these Rules;

(10) in trial, allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence, assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an accused, but a lawyer may argue, on analysis of evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matter stated herein;

(11) refuse to accede to reasonable requests of opposing counsel that do not prejudice the rights of the client;

(12) fail to use reasonable efforts to restrain and to prevent clients from doing those things that the lawyer ought not to do;

(13) suppress any evidence that the lawyer or client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce;

(14) advise or cause a person to become unavailable as a witness by leaving the jurisdiction or making secret their whereabouts within the jurisdiction; or

(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) are continuing duties and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.

(d) In an ex parte proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are adverse.

b. Also, Laurie's attorneys have offended Rule 3.4 of the RPC (Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel), which states:

a) A lawyer shall not:

(1) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;

(2) falsify evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law;

(3) request a person other than a client to refrain from voluntarily giving relevant information to another party unless:

(A) the person is a relative or an employee or other agent of a client; and

(B) the lawyer reasonably believes that the person's interests will not be adversely affected by refraining from giving such information.

c. Further, Laurie's attorneys have also offended Rule 4.1 of the RPC (Truthfulness in Statements to Others) which states:

In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not:

(a) make a statement of material fact or law to a third person which statement the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is false; or

(b) fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6.

II. PRIVATE PAPERS

Any documents required to be submitted/exchanged pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rules and/or Cook County Circuit Court Rules may not be entered into evidence

A Rule With the Force and Effect of "Law" That Requires Divulging Information About Oneself Is Facially Unconstitutional

14. Laurie, upon information and belief, intends to offer various private papers/documents belonging to Brian exclusively (e.g., financial documents and records, Asset Disclosure Statement, wage documents and records) (hereinafter "Private Papers"), provided by Brian pursuant to the purported authority of the Discovery Rules and the Mandatory Disclosure Rules which compelled Brian to produce them. Brian objects to any and all of these Private Papers being offered into evidence that he was compelled to produce, as they were a compulsory production of a private party's books and papers to be used against him.

[36] The rules of the circuit court, which have been of many years standing, provide for the practical and effective administration of the business of the court and are within the power of the court. Such rules must, of course, be consistent with the law.

People v. Lindsay, 412 Ill. 472, 107 N.E.2d 614 (1952).

And,

[19] Pursuant to legislative authority, *fn2 the rules of the circuit court of Cook County were adopted by the circuit judges in order to effectuate the administration of justice and to simplify judicial procedure. In determining the constitutionality of a legislative enactment or a law passed pursuant to legislative authority, the judiciary is limited to a determination of whether the law is a valid exercise of the State's police power to promote the public comfort, health, safety, morals or welfare. (Henson v. City of Chicago (1953), 415 Ill. 564, 570-71, 114 N.E.2d 778.) To be valid, the legislation must not only bear a reasonable relationship to one of the foregoing interests, but the means adopted to promote that interest must be reasonable. (Sherman-Reynolds, Inc. v. Mahin (1970), 47 Ill.2d 323, 327, 265 N.E.2d 640.) Because the legislature is granted broad discretion in determining how best to secure the interests of the public welfare, the court will not disturb a police regulation merely because there is a difference of opinion as to its wisdom, necessity or expediency. (City of Carbondale v. Brewster (1979), 78 Ill.2d 111, 115, 398 N.E.2d 829.) Moreover, a strong presumption of constitutional validity attaches to authorized enactments, and the party attacking a law has the burden of showing that it is unreasonable. People v. Copeland (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 475, 479-80, 415 N.E.2d 1173. [Footnote omitted].

People v. Adams, 451 N.E.2d 1351, 116 Ill. App.3d 315 (1983).

a. However, when a state "law" or rule affects FUNDAMENTAL Rights, as it so clearly does here, there is NO presumption of constitutionality and the court is REQUIRED to apply "strict scrutiny" - NOT the rational relation test (e.g., see paragraphs 65, 68.e, 68.k, 78, 79, and 80).

i.  No compelling reason exists for Brian to be required to turnover his Private Papers as part of a divorce proceeding. The State is purely using the implicated rules as a "fishing expedition" to circumvent a party's Rights.

ii. The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution specifically bars the use of compelled testimony against individuals.

1. The Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitution applies to both criminal and civil trials (see paragraph 15.a).

iii. In addition, verification of the Asset Disclosure Statement (i.e., the "13.3") requires that individuals produce their personal books and records (or be held in contempt), which violates the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.

iv. The requirements to submit all the personal and financial data requested in divorce proceedings also violate an individual's Right to privacy under the Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution (see paragraphs 61.a and 101).

b. Cook County Circuit Court Rule 13.3.1 (c) specifically states: "Failure of a party to timely serve the "Disclosure Statement" shall subject the non-complying party to such sanctions as the court deems appropriate, including all sanctions available under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 219." Therefore, Brian is obviously threatened with sanctions if he refuses to comply under the protection of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the Federal Constitution.

c. Brian was told by his attorneys, against his objections, that he was required per the implicated rules to submit these Private Papers to the Court and/or Laurie. Brian was therefore forced to divulge this information against his will. As Brian was required by "law" to turnover all of the Private Papers and therefore compelled, they may not be used against Brian in any way.

i.  If any of these Private Papers are used to present evidence that "justifies" Brian's ability to pay Laurie child support, maintenance, and/or attorneys' fees, these Private Papers are OBVIOUSLY being used against Brian to extort his property.

ii. Furthermore, without the use of these Private Papers, this Court lacks any evidence (as the "law" requires) to extort Brian's property and give it to Laurie. Thus again, it is OBVIOUS that these Private Papers will be used against Brian to take his property.

d. At no time was Brian told that he had the right to remain silent, that if he gave up the right to remain silent, that the Private Papers could be used against him and his property. Therefore, these Private Papers may not be admitted into evidence, or used against him, or used to take his property, as Brian was not given "free choice" to divulge the Private Papers.

e. These Private Papers will be a "material ingredient" in Laurie's and the State's continued pursuit to extort Brian's property. The government, Laurie, and Samantha are NOT "entitled" to possession of Brian's property as a result of this divorce proceeding.

f. Brian is innocent, but is "confounded with the guilty" when he was forced to turnover these Private Papers against his will.

15. Any court order or rule that requires the production of personal books and records without probable cause of something ILLEGAL, supported by oath or affirmation under penalties of perjury, is facially unconstitutional. This Court has no authority or jurisdiction to compel Brian to produce these Private Papers. It cannot be ANY clearer than the U.S. Supreme Court's words from 100 years ago:

[27] It is our opinion, therefore, that a compulsory production of a man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him, or to forfeit his property, is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, in all cases in which a search and seizure would be; because it is a material ingredient, and effects the sole object and purpose of search and seizure.

[28] ...It is contended by the counsel for the government, that it is a legitimate proceeding, sanctioned by long usage, and the authority of judicial decision. No doubt long usage, acquiesced in by the courts, goes a long way to prove that there is some plausible ground or reason for it in the law, or in the historical facts which have imposed a particular construction of the law favorable to such usage... The search for and seizure of stolen or forfeited goods, or goods liable to duties and concealed to avoid the payment thereof, are totally different things from a search for and seizure of a man's private books and papers for the purpose of obtaining information therein contained, or of using them as evidence against him. The two things differ toto coelo. In the one case, the government is entitled to the possession of the property; in the other it is not.

[29] But, when examined with care, it is manifest that there is a total unlikeness of these official acts and proceedings to that which is now under consideration. In the case of stolen goods, the owner from whom they were stolen is entitled to their possession; and in the case of excisable or dutiable articles, the government has an interest in them for the payment of the duties thereon, and until such duties are paid has a right to keep them under observation, or to pursue and drag them from concealment; and in the case of goods seized on attachment or execution, the creditor is entitled to their seizure in satisfaction of his debt; and the examination of a defendant under oath to obtain a discovery of concealed property or credits is a proceeding merely civil to effect the ends of justice, and is no more than what the court of chancery would direct on a bill for discovery. Whereas, by the proceeding now under consideration, the court attempts to extort from the party his private books and papers to make him liable for a penalty or to forfeit his property.

[35] "Papers are the owner's goods and chattels; they are his dearest property; and are so far from enduring a seizure, that they will hardly bear an inspection; and though the eye cannot by the laws of England be guilty of a trespass, yet where private papers are removed and carried away the secret nature of those goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand more considerable damages in that respect. Where is the written law that gives any magistrate such a power? I can safely answer, there is none; and, therefore, it is too much for us, without such authority, to pronounce a practice legal which would be subversive of all the comforts of society.

[40] "Lastly, it is urged as an argument of utility, that such a search is a means of detecting offenders by discovering evidence. I wish some cases had been shown, where the law forceth evidence out of the owner's custody by process. THERE IS NO PROCESS AGAINST PAPERS IN CIVIL CAUSES. IT HAS BEEN OFTEN TRIED, BUT NEVER PREVAILED. Nay, where the adversary has by force or fraud got possession of your own proper evidence, there is no way to get it back but by action. In the criminal law such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet there are some crimes, such, for instance, as murder, rape, robbery, and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-search in these cases to help forward the conviction. Whether this proceeds from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain that the law obliges no man to accuse himself; because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty."

[46] And any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath, or compelling the production of his private books and papers, to convict him of crime, or to forfeit his property, is contrary to the principles of a free government. It is abhorrent to the instincts of an Englishman; it is abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit the purposes of despotic power; but it cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom.

[51] We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two amendments. They throw great light on each other. For the "unreasonable searches and seizures" condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man "in a criminal case to be a witness against himself," which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the question as to what is an "unreasonable search and seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think it is within the clear intent and meaning of those terms. We are also clearly of opinion that proceedings instituted for the purpose of declaring the forfeiture of a man's property by reason of offences committed by him, THOUGH THEY MAY BE CIVIL IN FORM, are in their nature criminal... [W]e are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and seizure -- and an unreasonable search and seizure -- within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose.

[55] We think that the notice to produce the invoice in this case, the order by virtue of which it was issued, and the law which authorized the order, were unconstitutional and void, and that the inspection by the district attorney of said invoice, when produced in obedience to said notice, and its admission in evidence by the court, were erroneous and unconstitutional proceedings.

Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886).

And,

[30] The order of May 5 requiring appellant to produce the papers called for in the subpoena duces tecum was void under the Fourth Amendment. Its enforcement would amount to the ancient seizure and search which continued by usage in England until the decision of Lord Camden in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029. See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626; Hartranft's Appeal, 85 Pa. St. 433; Ex parte Brown, 72 Missouri, 83; In re Lester, 77 Georgia, 143; In re Morer, 101 N.W. Rep. 588.

[104] The individual may stand upon his constitutional rights as a citizen. He is entitled to carry on his private business in his own way. His power to contract is unlimited. He owes no duty to the State or to his neighbors to divulge his business, or to open his doors to an investigation, so far as it may tend to criminate him. He owes no such duty to the State, since he receives nothing therefrom, beyond the protection of his life and property. His rights are such as existed by the law of the land long antecedent to the organization of the State, and can only be taken from him by due process of law, and in accordance with the Constitution. Among his rights are a refusal to incriminate himself, and the immunity of himself and his property from arrest or seizure except under a warrant of the law. HE OWES NOTHING TO THE PUBLIC SO LONG AS HE DOES NOT TRESPASS UPON THEIR RIGHTS.

[108] We are also of opinion that an order for the production of books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the Fourth Amendment. While a search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, and a seizure contemplates a forcible dispossession of the owner, still, as was held in the Boyd case, the substance of the offense is the compulsory production of private papers, whether under a search warrant or a subpoena duces tecum, against which the person, be he individual or corporation, is entitled to protection. [Emphasis added].

Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 50 L. Ed. 652, 26 S. Ct. 370 (1906).

a. And, in case there is any doubt that the Fifth Amendment applies to civil cases in addition to criminal cases:

[29] The Government insists, broadly, that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination does not apply in any civil proceeding. The contrary must be accepted as settled. The privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceeding in which the testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings, wherever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it. The privilege protects a mere witness as fully as it does one who is also a party defendant. [Emphasis added].

McCarthy v Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 69 L. Ed. 158, 45 S. Ct. 16 (1924).

And,

[68] Today, then, there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves. [Emphasis added].

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).

i.  There can be no question that a setting in which Brian can lose (and has already lost) his Rights to his daughter and his property without criminal conviction constitutes a "setting[] in which [his] freedom of action is curtailed in [a] significant way." As only a few examples indicate, the Previous Court has already taken away Brian's Right to choose the education he wants for his daughter, the Right to spend time with her on his scheduled days, and the Right to his property (e.g., purported child support, maintenance), not to mention his Rights to Due Process and Equal Protection, ALL taken without ANY criminal conviction or accusation.

b. It is an established principle in American Jurisprudence that:

"The general misconception is that any statute passed by legislators bearing the appearance of law constitutes the law of the land. The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land, and any statue, to be valid, must be in agreement. It is impossible for both the Constitution and a law violating it to be valid; one must prevail. This is succinctly stated as follows: The general rule is that an unconstitutional statute, though having the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; since unconstitutionality dates from the time of its enactment, and not merely from the date of the decision so branding it. An unconstitutional law, in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it would be had the statute not been enacted."

"Since an unconstitutional law is void, the general principals follow that it imposes no duties, confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, and justifies no acts performed under it.... A void act cannot be legally consistent with a valid one. An unconstitutional law cannot operate to supersede any existing valid law. Indeed, insofar as a statute runs counter to the fundamental law of the land, it superseded thereby. No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law and no courts are bound to enforce it."

Volume 16, American Jurisprudence 2d, Section 256, page 177 (1979).

And,

[30] That act was therefore as inoperative as if it had never been passed, for an unconstitutional act is not a law, and can neither confer a right or immunity nor operate to supersede any existing valid law. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376.

Chicago v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 57 L. Ed. 966, 33 S. Ct. 581 (1913).

c. Therefore, the Mandatory Disclosure Rules are unconstitutional on their face and as applied. Additionally, the Discovery Rules in divorce proceedings are unconstitutional as applied. Hence, even though Brian has unwillingly turned over his Private Papers, these personal books and records may not be admitted into evidence or used in these proceedings in any way.

DISPUTED ITEMS

III. CUSTODY

The parties should maintain joint "custody" and equal parenting time and responsibilities

Recommendations from the Custody Evaluation Report and Associated "Expert" Witness Testimony Must Be Barred As They, As Well As All Custody Evaluations, Are "Junk Science," Unreliable, and Irrelevant

16. Brian has unwillingly submitted to the Court-ordered custody evaluation (hereinafter "Evaluation") performed by Dr. Alan P. Childs and Dr. Martin H. Blackman (hereinafter "Dr. Childs" and "Dr. Blackman" respectively) pursuant to 750 ILCS 604 (b).

[29] Duress exists where one is induced by the wrongful act of another to make a contract under circumstances which deprives her of the exercise of her free will. (Regenold v. Baby Fold, Inc. (1977), 68 Ill.2d 419, 432-33, 369 N.E.2d 858.) Mere annoyance or vexation will not constitute duress, but there must be such compulsion affecting the mind as shows that the execution of the note is not the voluntary act of the maker. (People ex rel. Drury v. Catholic Home Bureau (1966), 34 Ill.2d 84, 92-93, 213 N.E.2d 507.) The burden of proving such duress is on the person asserting it. 34 Ill.2d 84, 92, 213 N.E.2d 507.

First Security Bank v. Bawoll, 458 N.E.2d 193, 120 Ill. App.3d 787 (1983).

a. The Evaluation was performed against Brian's will and objections. But based on the strong "recommendation" of the Previous Court, the significant pressure applied from the Guardian Ad Litem (Jacalyn Birnbaum of Nadler, Pritikin and Mirabelli, hereinafter "Jacalyn Birnbaum"), and after his previous attorney (Jay Frank of Aronberg, Goldgehn, Davis and Garmisa, hereinafter "Jay Frank") immediately quit representing Brian when Brian initially refused, Brian, who at the time was unaware of his Right to privacy and other related Rights secured by the Federal Constitution, felt threatened to submit to this Evaluation in order to ensure equitable time with his daughter and therefore agreed to the Evaluation.

i.  On Sunday, February 10, 2002, Brian called Jay Frank seeking advice after Laurie had physically abused him multiple times. Jay Frank suggested that Brian go into court on February 11, 2002 in the morning and file an order of protection WITHOUT counsel because he would more likely get a favorable ruling. Jay Frank advised Brian to communicate to the Court:

1. That Brian needed to file this order of protection immediately.

2. That Brian's attorney was not available, which was the reason Brian was appearing by himself.

3. That Laurie might leave the state for New Jersey (where she had family) without any notice and take Samantha.

4. That the parties' previous agreement had been that the party that has scheduled time with Samantha also had exclusive access to the parties' car.

5. That Laurie might change the locks on the marital residence, which she had previously threatened to do.

6. That Brian requested the Court to prevent Laurie from removing Samantha from him when it was his scheduled time.

7. That Brian requested the Court to order Laurie not to destroy any of Brian's personal possessions in the marital residence.

8. That Brian requested the Court to order Laurie not to deny Brian access to the marital residence.

9. That Brian requested the Court to order Laurie not to do anything negative to Brian in front of Samantha.

ii. On the morning of February 11, 2002, Brian was afraid of making a legal mistake and asked a previous friend of his (who was not a divorce attorney but who also worked at Aronberg, Goldgehn, Davis and Garmisa) to assist him finding the correct rooms and completing the correct forms for the order of protection.

1. After Brian and his friend located the correct room and Brian completed the order of protection, Brian's friend suggested that he "may get into trouble" if he appeared in front of the Previous Court without proper representation.

2. Brian immediately communicated this with Jay Frank and begged him to represent him in court, which he unwillingly agreed to do.

3. After the hearing was transferred to multiple courtrooms, and after the closed-door pre-trial, Jay Frank advised Brian that the Previous Court was making a very strong "recommendation" that he have "visitation" with his daughter for only four out of the next fourteen days and immediately submit to the Evaluation. Jacalyn Birnbaum confirmed the Court's recommendation in the closed-door conference to Brian and strongly suggested that Brian agree. Jacalyn Birnbaum further suggested that there would be negative "ramifications" if Brian did not agree to the Previous Court's recommendations regarding visitation and the Evaluation.

4. Regardless of the significant pressure being applied by the Previous Court, Jacalyn Birnbaum, and Jay Frank, Brian refused the Evaluation and refused anything less than equal and shared custody. Upon Brian's refusal to agree to the Previous Court's and attorneys' "recommendations," Jay Frank immediately withdrew as Brian's attorney, stating to Brian that "he wasn't going to help him lose." As it was now the end of the day, no hearing took place.

5. Brian hired a new attorney on February 13, 2002.

iii. Out of fear of losing his daughter (considering all of the pressure), and after Laurie agreed to split Samantha's time equally with Brian, and upon the suggestion of Brian's replacement attorney (Michael Sabath of Kalcheim, Schatz, and Berger, hereinafter "Michael Sabath") to go along with the Previous Court's recommendation, and out of fear that the Previous Court would not approve/accept the party's agreement to allow Brian equal time with his daughter unless he agreed (based on Michael Sabath's counsel), Brian unwillingly agreed (i.e., under duress) to the Evaluation and to pay for half of the $8,000 Evaluation fee.

17. From the Evaluation, Dr. Childs and Dr. Blackman produced the custody evaluation report (hereinafter "Report").

18. Within the Report, Dr. Childs and Dr. Blackman formed a number of opinions, conclusions, and recommendations regarding the care, control, custody, and parenting time of Samantha (hereinafter "Recommendations").

19. Laurie, upon information and belief, intends to offer the Recommendations into evidence.

20. Laurie, upon information and belief, intends to offer Dr. Childs as an "expert" witness at the hearing, at which time he will testify regarding his Recommendations.

21. Laurie, upon information and belief, intends to offer testimony and evidence from Dana Royce Baerger, JD PhD (hereinafter "Dana Baerger") as another "expert" witness at the hearing, at which time she will testify regarding her Forensic Mental Health Report: Review of Child Custody Evaluation (submitted to the Court on May 8, 2003 as Respondent's Additional Answers to Interrogatories Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 213) which is an analysis of the Recommendations and supporting data used to develop the Recommendations (hereinafter "Analysis of Recommendations").

a. As an aside, at no time did Brian give Dana Baerger any authorization to review his personal/private information contained in the Report.

22. However, this Court has a "gatekeeping" obligation to keep "pseudoscience" (also known as "junk science") out of the courtroom. Brian objects to any and all "expert" testimony, analysis, and opinions regarding the Report, Recommendations, and Analysis of Recommendations.

a. Additionally, as Brian agreed to allow the Evaluation under duress, the Recommendations must be barred.

23. Regardless of the length or depth of experience on the purported experts' Curriculum Vitae,[14] it is self-evident that the Recommendations and Analysis of Recommendations are not based on any reliable foundation or science.[15] As per a subpoena served on Dr. Childs on or around December 17, 2002, as well as a Court order issued on March 13, 2003, Dr. Childs was ordered to, but did not, turn over the following information to Brian:

a. Names of any and all experts relied upon and/or upon which he intended to base his testimony, and;

b. All books, periodicals, or other publications relied upon, and;

c. Any articles, periodicals, or other publications he had authored or been involved with in any way, and;

d. Any test results.

24. Laurie, Dr. Childs, Dr. Blackman, and Dana Baerger have not presented any support, valid or otherwise, that a custody evaluation has general acceptance in the scientific field, or that a custody evaluation has any supporting scientific evidence, or that a custody evaluation measures parental fitness.

a. The "most commonly accepted" definition of science "among the general population... is that science concerns a collection of facts so well established that they are generally considered true, or at least considered to possess a reasonable certainty of truth."[16]

b. By their own admissions, psychologists recognize that custody evaluations are an "art," fully admit that their "concerns about many of the instruments ostensibly developed for child custody evaluations is the lack of scientific foundation for interpreting them," fully admit that the standards, methods, and procedures for custody evaluations are "not sufficiently developed," and also admit that there is insufficient "consensus among scholars and practitioners."[17]

c. Psychologists also readily admit that no test, standard, or criteria exist that adequately measures parental fitness or a child's best living arrangements, nor translates into what is in a child's best interest.[18]

d. The relationship between law and mental health disciplines, especially child custody evaluations, has generally been marked by ambivalence.[19]

e. In this Evaluation, as well as the Analysis of Recommendations, as well as ALL custody evaluations, the facts and data are insufficient and irrelevant, reliable scientific principles and methods are not used, the purported "experts" do not apply the scientific principles and methods reliably, and the opinions routinely exceed the limitations of empirically-based scientific knowledge.[20]

i.  In fact, the best that mental health professionals stri